Humanity’s First Exam1850–1940 ⇄ now

1818 · English

Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus (1818 edition)

Mary Shelley

3 selected passages and classifications

Passage 1

Remember, that I am thy creature: I ought to be thy Adam; but I am rather the fallen angel, whom thou drivest from joy for no misdeed. Every where I see bliss, from which I alone am irrevocably excluded. I was benevolent and good; misery made me a fiend. Make me happy, and I shall again be virtuous.

The creature claims a creator’s obligation toward a feeling, morally responsive being whose character has been damaged by abandonment and exclusion.

Volume II, Chapter II, the creature appeals to his creator

Passage 2

I am malicious because I am miserable; am I not shunned and hated by all mankind? You, my creator, would tear me to pieces, and triumph; remember that, and tell me why I should pity man more than he pities me? You would not call it murder, if you could precipitate me into one of those ice-rifts, and destroy my frame, the work of your own hands. Shall I respect man, when he contemns me? Let him live with me in the interchange of kindness, and, instead of injury, I would bestow every benefit upon him with tears of gratitude at his acceptance. But that cannot be; the human senses are insurmountable barriers to our union. Yet mine shall not be the submission of abject slavery. I will revenge my injuries: if I cannot inspire love, I will cause fear; and chiefly towards you my arch-enemy, because my creator, do I swear inextinguishable hatred.

Shelley presents antagonistic action not as a defect in an inert device but as a response to misery, social rejection, and a creator’s refusal of responsibility.

Volume III, Chapter III, the creature’s demand for a companion

Passage 3

In a fit of enthusiastic madness I created a rational creature, and was bound towards him, to assure, as far as was in my power, his happiness and well-being. This was my duty; but there was another still paramount to that. My duties towards my fellow-creatures had greater claims to my attention, because they included a greater proportion of happiness or misery. Urged by this view, I refused, and I did right in refusing, to create a companion for the first creature.

Victor explicitly frames creation as an obligation to a rational being, then sets that obligation against his claimed responsibility to the wider human community.

Volume III, Chapter VII, Victor’s retrospective account

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