Humanity’s First Exam1850–1940 ⇄ now

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Primary sources with passages selected for the project. Sort the columns, filter the catalogue, or open a row to read the evidence.

63 sources with passages · 61 full texts · 13 languages

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1637Philosophy · English

Discourse on the Method

Rene Descartes

Machine minds and made personsmeaning and understandingNo judgment

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

And here I specially stayed to show that, were there such machines exactly resembling organs and outward form an ape or any other irrational animal, we could have no means of knowing that they were in any respect of a different nature from these animals; but if there were machines bearing the image of our bodies, and capable of imitating our actions as far as it is morally possible, there would still remain two most certain tests whereby to know that they were not therefore really men. Of these the first is that they could never use words or other signs arranged in such a manner as is competent to us in order to declare our thoughts to others: for we may easily conceive a machine to be so constructed that it emits vocables, and even that it emits some correspondent to the action upon it of external objects which cause a change in its organs; for example, if touched in a particular place it may demand what we wish to say to it; if in another it may cry out that it is hurt, and such like; but not that it should arrange them variously so as appositely to reply to what is said in its presence, as men of the lowest grade of intellect can do.
Part V, tests distinguishing a machine from a human beingpassage classification

Descartes makes context-sensitive expression of thought, rather than outward resemblance or a stimulus-bound vocal response, the test that a humanlike machine cannot meet.

Passage 2 · English

I had after this described the reasonable soul, and shown that it could by no means be educed from the power of matter, as the other things of which I had spoken, but that it must be expressly created; and that it is not sufficient that it be lodged in the human body exactly like a pilot in a ship, unless perhaps to move its members, but that it is necessary for it to be joined and united more closely to the body, in order to have sensations and appetites similar to ours, and thus constitute a real man.
Part V, the rational soulpassage classification

A real person requires a rational soul, irreducible to matter and intimately united with a body; mechanical movement alone therefore does not make a human being.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1651Philosophy · English

Leviathan

Thomas Hobbes

Cognition, attention, and judgmentreasoning as reckoningNo judgment

1 selected passage · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

Out of all which we may define, (that is to say determine,) what that is, which is meant by this word Reason, when wee reckon it amongst the Faculties of the mind. For Reason, in this sense, is nothing but Reckoning (that is, Adding and Substracting) of the Consequences of generall names agreed upon, for the Marking and Signifying of our thoughts; I say Marking them, when we reckon by our selves; and Signifying, when we demonstrate, or approve our reckonings to other men.
Chapter V, "Of Reason, and Science"passage classification

Hobbes explicitly defines reasoning as rule-governed addition and subtraction over agreed general names, usable both privately and in demonstration to others.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1818Fiction · English

Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus (1818 edition)

Mary Shelley

Machine minds and made personsMade beings may deserve moral standingMixed

3 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

Remember, that I am thy creature: I ought to be thy Adam; but I am rather the fallen angel, whom thou drivest from joy for no misdeed. Every where I see bliss, from which I alone am irrevocably excluded. I was benevolent and good; misery made me a fiend. Make me happy, and I shall again be virtuous.
Volume II, Chapter II, the creature appeals to his creatorpassage classification

The creature claims a creator’s obligation toward a feeling, morally responsive being whose character has been damaged by abandonment and exclusion.

Passage 2 · English

I am malicious because I am miserable; am I not shunned and hated by all mankind? You, my creator, would tear me to pieces, and triumph; remember that, and tell me why I should pity man more than he pities me? You would not call it murder, if you could precipitate me into one of those ice-rifts, and destroy my frame, the work of your own hands. Shall I respect man, when he contemns me? Let him live with me in the interchange of kindness, and, instead of injury, I would bestow every benefit upon him with tears of gratitude at his acceptance. But that cannot be; the human senses are insurmountable barriers to our union. Yet mine shall not be the submission of abject slavery. I will revenge my injuries: if I cannot inspire love, I will cause fear; and chiefly towards you my arch-enemy, because my creator, do I swear inextinguishable hatred.
Volume III, Chapter III, the creature’s demand for a companionpassage classification

Shelley presents antagonistic action not as a defect in an inert device but as a response to misery, social rejection, and a creator’s refusal of responsibility.

Passage 3 · English

In a fit of enthusiastic madness I created a rational creature, and was bound towards him, to assure, as far as was in my power, his happiness and well-being. This was my duty; but there was another still paramount to that. My duties towards my fellow-creatures had greater claims to my attention, because they included a greater proportion of happiness or misery. Urged by this view, I refused, and I did right in refusing, to create a companion for the first creature.
Volume III, Chapter VII, Victor’s retrospective accountpassage classification

Victor explicitly frames creation as an obligation to a rational being, then sets that obligation against his claimed responsibility to the wider human community.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1836Journalism · English

Maelzel's Chess-Player

Edgar Allan Poe

Cognition, attention, and judgmentcalculation is insufficientNo judgment

1 selected passage · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

Arithmetical or algebraical calculations are, from their very nature, fixed and determinate. Certain ''data'' being given, certain results necessarily and inevitably follow. These results have dependence upon nothing, and are influenced by nothing but the ''data'' originally given. And the question to be solved proceeds, or should proceed, to its final determination, by a succession of unerring steps liable to no change, and subject to no modification. This being the case, we can without difficulty conceive the ''possibility'' of so arranging a piece of mechanism, that upon starting it in accordance with the ''data'' of the question to be solved, it should continue its movements regularly, progressively, and undeviatingly towards the required solution, since these movements, however complex, are never imagined to be otherwise than finite and determinate. But the case is widely different with the Chess-Player. With him there is no determinate progression. No one move in chess necessarily follows upon any one other. From no particular disposition of the men at one period of a game can we predicate their disposition at a different period. Let us place the ''first move'' in a game of chess, in juxta-position with the ''data'' of an algebraical question, and their great difference will be immediately perceived. From the latter — from the ''data'' — the second step of the question, dependent thereupon, inevitably follows. It is modeled by the ''data''. It must be ''thus'' and not otherwise. But from the first move in the game of chess no especial second move follows of necessity. In the algebraical question, as it proceeds towards solution, the ''certainty'' of its operations remains altogether unimpaired. The second step having been a consequence of the ''data'', the third step is equally a consequence of the second, the fourth of the third, the fifth of the fourth, and so on, ''and not possibly otherwise'', to the end. But in proportion to the progress made in a game of chess, is the ''uncertainty'' of each ensuing move. A few moves having been made, ''no'' step is certain. Different spectators of the game would advise different moves. All is then dependent upon the variable judgment of the players.
“Maelzel’s Chess-Player,” comparison of calculation and chesspassage classification

Poe grants that a mechanism can execute a determinate calculation, but argues that chess calls for judgment among moves that no prior position necessitates.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1843Science or medicine · English

Notes to the Sketch of the Analytical Engine

Ada Lovelace

Tools and agentsMachines cannot originate purposesNo judgment

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

The Analytical Engine has no pretensions whatever to originate any thing. It can do whatever we know how to order it to perform. It can follow analysis; but it has no power of anticipating any analytical relations or truths. Its province is to assist us in making available what we are already acquainted with.
Note G, conclusion on the Analytical Engine’s powerspassage classification

Lovelace distinguishes following a supplied analysis from originating or anticipating an analytical relation, assigning the Engine an executive rather than inventive role.

Passage 2 · English

This it is calculated to effect primarily and chiefly of course, through its executive faculties; but it is likely to exert an indirect and reciprocal influence on science itself in another manner. For, in so distributing and combining the truths and the formulæ of analysis, that they may become most easily and rapidly amenable to the mechanical combinations of the engine, the relations and the nature of many subjects in that science are necessarily thrown into new lights, and more profoundly investigated. This is a decidedly indirect, and a somewhat speculative, consequence of such an invention. It is however pretty evident, on general principles, that in devising for Mathematical truths a new form in which to record and throw themselves out for actual use, views are likely to be induced, which should again react on the more theoretical phase of the subject.
Note G, indirect effects of the Analytical Engine on mathematical inquirypassage classification

Lovelace separately allows that arranging knowledge for mechanical execution can alter human inquiry: the engine remains an instrument, while its use may disclose new relations to human investigators.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1852Public address · English

Lectures and Miscellanies

Henry James Sr.

Government, measurement, and surveillanceTechnology should remain under human controlEnlarges

1 selected passage · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

This being the case with every nation, with every form of political life known to the world, it is manifest that the Democratic idea, in affirming the sovereignty of the people, or their responsibility to their own welfare alone, vacates every mode of national or political existence, by vacating the sacredness of the institutions on which such existence is based. In affirming the sovereignty of the people, the Democratic idea denies institutions any intrinsic or absolute sanctity, any sanctity save that which they derive from reflecting the popular well-being. It avouches the sole sacredness of humanity, and allows no sanctity to institutions underived from that source.
Lecture 1, “Democracy and Its Issues,” p. 8passage classification

James makes institutions answerable to collective human welfare rather than treating their inherited authority as autonomous or sacred.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1861Politics or economics · English

Considerations on Representative Government

John Stuart Mill

Government, measurement, and surveillanceHuman institutions create the dangerDiminishes

3 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

The thing appears perfectly easy to superficial observers. If India (for example) is not fit to govern itself, all that seems to them required is that there should be a minister to govern it, and that this minister, like all other British ministers, should be responsible to the British Parliament. Unfortunately this, though the simplest mode of attempting to govern a dependency, is about the worst, and betrays in its advocates a total want of comprehension of the conditions of good government. To govern a country under responsibility to the people of that country, and to govern one country under responsibility to the people of another, are two very different things. What makes the excellence of the first is, that freedom is preferable to despotism: but the last _is_ despotism. The only choice the case admits is a choice of despotisms, and it is not certain that the despotism of twenty millions is necessarily better than that of a few or of one; but it is quite certain that the despotism of those who neither hear, nor see, nor know any thing about their subjects, has many chances of being worse than that of those who do.
Local word range 88751–89175passage classification

Mill argues that foreign rule, even when formally responsible to a parliament, is still despotism because the governed people do not control or directly hold their rulers accountable. He examines how political arrangements and the rulers' distance from their subjects affect the quality of government, warning against paternal administration presented as self-government.

Passage 2 · English

Let us remember, then, in the first place, that political institutions (however the proposition may be at times ignored) are the work of men--owe their origin and their whole existence to human will. Men did not wake on a summer morning and find them sprung up. Neither do they resemble trees, which, once planted, "are aye growing" while men "are sleeping." In every stage of their existence they are made what they are by human voluntary agency. Like all things, therefore, which are made by men, they may be either well or ill made; judgment and skill may have been exercised in their production, or the reverse of these. On the other hand, it is also to be borne in mind that political machinery does not act of itself. As it is first made, so it has to be worked, by men, and even by ordinary men. It needs, not their simple acquiescence, but their active participation; and must be adjusted to the capacities and qualities of such men as are available.
Chapter I, “To What Extent Forms of Government Are a Matter of Choice”passage classification

Mill treats institutions as deliberately made arrangements rather than self-acting organisms, while insisting that their operation depends on the judgment, capacity, and active participation of those governed.

Passage 3 · English

Suppose the difficulty vanquished. What should we then have? One man of superhuman mental activity managing the entire affairs of a mentally passive people. Their passivity is implied in the very idea of absolute power. The nation as a whole, and every individual composing it, are without any potential voice in their own destiny. They exercise no will in respect to their collective interests. All is decided for them by a will not their own, which it is legally a crime for them to disobey. What sort of human beings can be formed under such a regimen? What development can either their thinking or their active faculties attain under it? On matters of pure theory they might perhaps be allowed to speculate, so long as their speculations either did not approach politics, or had not the remotest connection with its practice. On practical affairs they could at most be only suffered to suggest; and even under the most moderate of despots, none but persons of already admitted or reputed superiority could hope that their suggestions would be known to, much less regarded by, those who had the management of affairs. A person must have a very unusual taste for intellectual exercise in and for itself who will put himself to the trouble of thought when it is to have no outward effect, or qualify himself for functions which he has no chance of being allowed to exercise.
Chapter III, “That the Ideally Best Form of Government is Representative Government”passage classification

Mill argues that being governed in place of acting on one’s collective interests diminishes both practical autonomy and the faculties that participation exercises.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1862Philosophy · French

Du principe vital et de l’âme pensante

Francisque Bouillier

Free will and automatismRejects: Machines remain toolsEnlarges

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · French

Sans doute, la conscience nous apprend que nous pensons; si nous ne pensions pas, nous ne saurions pas que nous existons. Mais elle nous apprend en même temps qu’il y a en nous, ou plutôt que nous sommes nous-mêmes, un principe essentiellement actif, cause et sujet de la pensée, sans lequel la pensée elle-même n’existerait pas. Cette prise de possession de soi-même, ce redoublement sur soi, cette opposition du moi à ce qui n’est pas moi, condition essentielle de toute pensée, n’exigent-ils pas nécessairement un sujet doué d’activité, activité qui n’est pas moins présente à la conscience que la pensée elle-même et qui ne peut s’en séparer? Mais, après avoir considéré l’âme humaine dans ce qu’elle a de commun avec toutes les autres âmes, il faut la considérer aussi dans ce qu’elle a de spécial, sa prééminence infinie, et, à proprement parler, sa spiritualité. Il faut distinguer, en effet, l’immatérialité de la spiritualité. De cela seul que l’être de l’âme est cause et force, sans aucun rapport de ressemblance avec l’étendue et la figure, avec rien qui puisse se représenter aux sens et à l’imagination, de cela seul qu’il est essentiellement actif, un et identique, il suit que l’âme est immatérielle. Partout où il y a l’activité essentielle avec l’unité, il y a l’immatérialité; toutes les âmes sans exception, celles des animaux et celles des plantes, toutes les forces de la nature sont immatérielles. Mais cette immatérialité n’est que la base de la spiritualité et non la spiritualité elle-même. La spiritualité, c’est l’immatérialité accompagnée de certains attributs, de la liberté et de l’intelligence. L’âme, telle que la conscience nous la révèle, n’est donc pas seulement une force soi-mouvante, un primum movens, mais une force qui se sait agissante, qui est maîtresse d’une partie de ses actions, une force intelligente et libre. Voilà ce que l’âme humaine possède en propre, voilà ce qui lui appartient à l’exclusion de toutes les autres âmes. […] Qu’est-ce donc que l’âme, et qu’est-ce que la spiritualité? L’âme est une force, une force motrice, une force intelligente et libre. La spiritualité commence où commence l’intelligence; elle a pour base l’activité essentielle et l’unité, elle a pour couronnement l’intelligence et la liberté.

Working English translation

Consciousness undoubtedly teaches us that we think; if we did not think, we would not know that we exist. But at the same time it teaches us that there is within us—or rather, that we ourselves are—an essentially active principle, the cause and subject of thought, without which thought itself would not exist. This taking possession of oneself, this turning back upon oneself, this opposition of the self to what is not the self, which is an essential condition of all thought—do these not necessarily require a subject endowed with activity, an activity no less present to consciousness than thought itself and inseparable from it? But after considering the human soul in what it has in common with all other souls, we must also consider what is distinctive in it: its infinite preeminence and, properly speaking, its spirituality. Immateriality must indeed be distinguished from spirituality. From the mere fact that the being of the soul is cause and force, bearing no resemblance to extension or figure, or to anything that can be represented to the senses and the imagination; from the mere fact that it is essentially active, one, and identical, it follows that the soul is immaterial. Wherever essential activity is joined with unity, there is immateriality. All souls without exception—the souls of animals and plants—and all the forces of nature are immaterial. But this immateriality is only the basis of spirituality, not spirituality itself. Spirituality is immateriality accompanied by certain attributes: freedom and intelligence. The soul, as consciousness reveals it to us, is therefore not merely a self-moving force, a primum movens, but a force that knows itself to be acting, that is master of some of its actions, an intelligent and free force. This is what the human soul possesses as its own and what belongs to it to the exclusion of all other souls. […] What, then, are the soul and spirituality? The soul is a force: a motive force, an intelligent and free force. Spirituality begins where intelligence begins; its basis is essential activity and unity, and its culmination is intelligence and freedom.
pp. 15–16, 28–30passage classification

Bouillier grounds thought in an essentially active, unified, self-knowing subject. Intelligence and freedom make the human soul spiritual, so neither can be reduced to an arrangement of material parts.

Passage 2 · French

L'âme, telle que la conscience nous la révèle, n'est donc pas seulement une force soi-mouvante, un primum movens, mais une force qui se sait agissante, qui est maîtresse d'une partie de ses actions, une force intelligente et libre. Voilà ce que l'âme humaine possède en propre, voilà ce qui lui appartient à l'exclusion de toutes les autres âmes. Nous ne voulons pas dire qu'elle ne puisse exister sans avoir conscience d'elle-même, sans exercer l'intelligence et la liberté, mais nous disons que toujours elle contient ces perfections, sinon en acte, au moins en puissance, ce qui suffit pour qu'en tout état, et quand elle ne les a pas encore, et quand elle les a momentanément perdues, elle garde sa prééminence sur toutes les autres âmes qui nous sont connues. Qu'est-ce donc que l'âme, et qu'est-ce que la spiritualité ? L'âme est une force, une force motrice, une force intelligente et libre. La spiritualité commence où commence l'intelligence ; elle a pour base l'activité essentielle et l'unité, elle a pour couronnement l'intelligence et la liberté.
Part I, chapter 1, “De la nature de l'âme,” pp. 28–30passage classification

Bouillier distinguishes merely self-moving force from human spirituality: conscious intelligence and freedom make the soul more than a mechanism's activity.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1862Philosophy · English

First Principles

Herbert Spencer

Progress and declineNo judgment

1 selected passage · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

The class of phenomena to be considered under the title of Evolution, is in a great measure co-extensive with the class commonly indicated by the word Progress. But the word Progress is here inappropriate, for several reasons. To specify these reasons will perhaps be the best way of showing what is to be understood by Evolution.
Chapter II, ‘The Law of Evolution,’ pp. 144–146passage classification

Spencer distinguishes evolution from progress: a broad account of lawful change does not by itself establish moral improvement, human flourishing, or a direction history ought to take.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1863English

Darwin among the Machines

Samuel Butler

Machines may succeed humanity
We are ourselves creating our own successors; we are daily adding to the beauty and delicacy of their physical organisation; we are daily giving them greater power and supplying by all sorts of ingenious contrivances that self-regulating, self-acting power which will be to them what intellect has been to the human race. In the course of ages we shall find ourselves the inferior race. … Day by day, however, the machines are gaining ground upon us; day by day we are becoming more subservient to them; more men are daily bound down as slaves to tend them, more men are daily devoting the energies of their whole lives to the development of mechanical life.
The Press (Christchurch, N.Z.), 13 June 1863
Themes
—
1864Science or medicine · English

Passages from the Life of a Philosopher

Charles Babbage

Machine minds and made personsConsiders: Machines remain toolsNo judgment

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

The mechanical means I employed to make these carriages bears some slight analogy to the operation of the faculty of memory. A toothed wheel had the ten digits marked upon its edge; between the nine and the zero a projecting tooth was placed. Whenever any wheel, in receiving addition, passed from nine to zero, the projecting tooth pushed over a certain lever. Thus, as soon as the nine seconds of time required for addition were ended, every carriage which had become due was indicated by the altered position of its lever. An arm now went round, which was so contrived that the act of replacing that lever caused the carriage which its position indicated to be made to the next figure above. But this figure might be a nine, in which case, in passing to zero, it would put over its lever, and so on. By placing the arms spirally round an axis, these successive carriages were accomplished. Multitudes of contrivances were designed, and almost endless drawings made, for the purpose of economizing the time and simplifying the mechanism of carriage. In that portion of the Difference Engine in the Exhibition of 1862 the time of carriage has been reduced to about one-fourth part of what was at first required. At last having exhausted, during years of labour, the principle of successive carriages, it occurred to me that it might be possible to teach mechanism to accomplish another mental process, namely—to foresee. This idea occurred to me in October, 1834. It cost me much thought, but the principle was arrived at in a short time. As soon as that was attained, the next step was to teach the mechanism which could foresee to act upon that foresight. This was not so difficult: certain mechanical means were soon devised which, although very far from simple, were yet sufficient to demonstrate the possibility of constructing such machinery. The process of simplifying this form of carriage occupied me, at intervals, during a long series of years. The demands of the Analytical Engine, for the mechanical execution of arithmetical operations, were of the most extensive kind. The multitude of similar parts required by the Analytical Engine, amounting in some instances to upwards of fifty thousand, rendered any, even the simplest, improvement of each part a matter of the highest importance, more especially as regarded the diminished amount of expenditure for its construction.
Chapter V, ‘Of the Mechanical Arrangements necessary for computing Tables by the Method of Differences’passage classification

Babbage describes a carry mechanism whose levers retain pending carries (‘memory’) and whose anticipatory arrangement can be said to ‘foresee.’ The passage applies a narrowly specified mental operation to machinery; it does not claim that the engine has general reason, initiative, or will.

Passage 2 · English

At last having exhausted, during years of labour, the principle of successive carriages, it occurred to me that it might be possible to teach mechanism to accomplish another mental process, namely—to foresee. This idea occurred to me in October, 1834. It cost me much thought, but the principle was arrived at in a short time. As soon as that was attained, the next step was to teach the mechanism which could foresee to act upon that foresight. This was not so difficult: certain mechanical means were soon devised which, although very far from simple, were yet sufficient to demonstrate the possibility of constructing such machinery.
Chapter V, “Difference Engine No. I,” section on successive carriagepassage classification

Babbage uses the language of foresight for a mechanism that anticipates a numerical consequence and then acts on the result; the claim is technical, not a claim of independent machine personhood.

Not yet classified in the current schema

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

What the creature is in-himself or essentially, must become phenomenally organized to his own experience, in order to his having any consciousness, or before he can claim that projection from his creator which makes existence or anything else predicable of him. And finite existence, existence in time and space, alone expresses what the creature is in-himself or essentially, namely: a form of universal destitution and hence of dependence upon what is not him^ self
Chapter 15 · p. 266 · JTP-034passage classification

A creator–creature account of consciousness and dependence; an analogue for made minds, not a direct rights claim.

Passage 2 · English

What then is the remedy ? How shall we reinstate marriage in men's reverence, and rescue it from the purely hypocritical patronage it receives at the hands of our swarming scribes and Pharisees ? The answer is very simple, namely : by leaving the institution more in woman's keeping, and less in man's ; by making her most answerable for its honor, who is most interested in its stability.
Chapter 26 · p. 519passage classification

James proposes a legal reallocation of marital authority as the condition of a wife's freedom.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1867Politics or economics · English translation

Capital, Volume I, Chapter 15: Machinery and Modern Industry

Karl Marx

Labour and mechanizationConsiders: Machines remain toolsDiminishes

3 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English translation

At the same time that factory work exhausts the nervous system to the uttermost, it does away with the many-sided play of the muscles, and confiscates every atom of freedom, both in bodily and intellectual activity. The lightening of the labour, even, becomes a sort of torture, since the machine does not free the labourer from work, but deprives the work of all interest. Every kind of capitalist production, in so far as it is not only a labour-process, but also a process of creating surplus-value, has this in common, that it is not the workman that employs the instruments of labour, but the instruments of labour that employ the workman. But it is only in the factory system that this inversion for the first time acquires technical and palpable reality. By means of its conversion into an automaton, the instrument of labour confronts the labourer, during the labour-process, in the shape of capital, of dead labour, that dominates, and pumps dry, living labour-power. The separation of the intellectual powers of production from the manual labour, and the conversion of those powers into the might of capital over labour, is, as we have already shown, finally completed by modern industry erected on the foundation of machinery.
Local word range 17396–17820passage classificationsource wording still to be checked

Marx argues that factory machinery reverses the relation between worker and instrument: the instruments employ and dominate the worker. Capitalist ownership also separates intellectual powers from manual labour, producing exhaustion, loss of interest, deskilling, and diminished bodily and intellectual freedom.

Passage 2 · English translation

Here as everywhere else, we must distinguish between the increased productiveness due to the development of the social process of production, and that due to the capitalist exploitation of that process. In handicrafts and manufacture, the workman makes use of a tool, in the factory, the machine makes use of him. There the movements of the instrument of labour proceed from him, here it is the movements of the machine that he must follow. In manufacture the workmen are parts of a living mechanism. In the factory we have a lifeless mechanism independent of the workman, who becomes its mere living appendage.
Capital, vol. I, ch. 15, §4, “The Factory”passage classification

Marx distinguishes the machine’s technical role from the capitalist social relation that turns it into worker dependence.

Passage 3 · English translation

It is an undoubted fact that machinery, as such, is not responsible for “setting free” the workman from the means of subsistence. It cheapens and increases production in that branch which it seizes on, and at first makes no change in the mass of the means of subsistence produced in other branches.
Capital, vol. I, ch. 15, §6passage classification

Marx separates machinery’s technical effect from the social organization responsible for deprivation.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1869Philosophy · English

The Subjection of Women

John Stuart Mill

Moral responsibilityHuman institutions create the dangerEnlarges

3 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

The equality of married persons before the law, is not only the sole mode in which that particular relation can be made consistent with justice to both sides, and conducive to the happiness of both, but it is the only means of rendering the daily life of mankind, in any high sense, a school of moral cultivation. Though the truth may not be felt or generally acknowledged for generations to come, the only school of genuine moral sentiment is society between equals. The moral education of mankind has hitherto emanated chiefly from the law of force, and is adapted almost solely to the relations which force creates. In the less advanced states of society, people hardly recognise any relation with their equals. To be an equal is to be an enemy. Society, from its highest place to its lowest, is one long chain, or rather ladder, where every individual is either above or below his nearest neighbour, and wherever he does not command he must obey. Existing moralities, accordingly, are mainly fitted to a relation of command and obedience. Yet command and obedience are but unfortunate necessities of human life: society in equality is its normal state.
Local word range 18106–18530passage classification

Mill argues that legal equality in marriage is necessary for justice and happiness, and that relations among equals cultivate genuine moral sentiment better than command and obedience. He therefore presents equality as a social and legal arrangement that enlarges human moral development and self-government.

Passage 2 · English

All women are brought up from the very earliest years in the belief that their ideal of character is the very opposite to that of men; not self-will, and government by self-control, but submission, and yielding to the control of others. All the moralities tell them that it is the duty of women, and all the current sentimentalities that it is their nature, to live for others; to make complete abnegation of themselves, and to have no life but in their affections.
The Subjection of Women, chapter Ipassage classification

Mill argues that gendered education produces dependence by forming character around submission rather than self-command.

Passage 3 · English

The equality of married persons before the law, is not only the sole mode in which that particular relation can be made consistent with justice to both sides, and conducive to the happiness of both, but it is the only means of rendering the daily life of mankind, in any high sense, a school of moral cultivation. Though the truth may not be felt or generally acknowledged for generations to come, the only school of genuine moral sentiment is society between equals. The moral education of mankind has hitherto emanated chiefly from the law of force, and is adapted almost solely to the relations which force creates.
The Subjection of Women, chapter IIpassage classification

Mill presents equal legal marriage as both justice and the social condition for genuine moral education.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1870English

Protoplasm; or, Life, force, and matter

Lionel Smith Beale

Life cannot be reduced to mechanism
There is in living matter nothing which can be called a mechanism, nothing in which structure can be discerned. A little transparent colourless material is the seat of these marvellous powers or properties by which the form, structure, and function of the tissues and organs of all living things are determined.
2nd ed., London: J. Churchill & Sons
Themes
—
1871Science or medicine · English

The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex

Charles Darwin

Heredity and biological controlRejects: Life cannot be reduced to mechanismNo judgment

3 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

Nevertheless the difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not of kind. We have seen that the senses and intuitions, the various emotions and faculties, such as love, memory, attention, curiosity, imitation, reason, etc., of which man boasts, may be found in an incipient, or even sometimes in a well-developed condition, in the lower animals. They are also capable of some inherited improvement, as we see in the domestic dog compared with the wolf or jackal. If it could be proved that certain high mental powers, such as the formation of general concepts, self-consciousness, etc., were absolutely peculiar to man, which seems extremely doubtful, it is not improbable that these qualities are merely the incidental results of other highly-advanced intellectual faculties; and these again mainly the result of the continued use of a perfect language. At what age does the new-born infant possess the power of abstraction, or become self-conscious, and reflect on its own existence? We cannot answer; nor can we answer in regard to the ascending organic scale. The half-art, half-instinct of language still bears the stamp of its gradual evolution.
Local word range 59286–59710passage classification

Darwin argues that human mental powers differ from those of other animals by degree rather than kind, and that faculties can show inherited improvement and gradual evolution. The passage rejects a sharp non-mechanical distinction between human and animal mental life, but it does not directly evaluate human autonomy or develop a machine argument. The fit of the vitalism claim is therefore indirect.

Passage 2 · English

The following proposition seems to me in a high degree probable—namely, that any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, the parental and filial affections being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well, or nearly as well developed, as in man. […] THIRDLY, after the power of language had been acquired, and the wishes of the community could be expressed, the common opinion how each member ought to act for the public good, would naturally become in a paramount degree the guide to action. […] LASTLY, habit in the individual would ultimately play a very important part in guiding the conduct of each member; for the social instinct, together with sympathy, is, like any other instinct, greatly strengthened by habit, and so consequently would be obedience to the wishes and judgment of the community.
Chapter V, ‘The moral sense’passage classification

Darwin gives an evolutionary account of conscience in which sympathy, community judgment, language, and habit jointly guide conduct; autonomy is socially formed rather than simply uncaused.

Passage 3 · English

We civilised men, on the other hand, do our utmost to check the process of elimination; we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, and the sick; we institute poor-laws; and our medical men exert their utmost skill to save the life of every one to the last moment. […] The aid which we feel impelled to give to the helpless is mainly an incidental result of the instinct of sympathy, which was originally acquired as part of the social instincts, but subsequently rendered, in the manner previously indicated, more tender and more widely diffused. Nor could we check our sympathy, even at the urging of hard reason, without deterioration in the noblest part of our nature. […] We must therefore bear the undoubtedly bad effects of the weak surviving and propagating their kind.
Chapter V, ‘Natural Selection as Affecting Civilised Nations’passage classification

Darwin frames care for vulnerable people as both an evolutionary problem and an indispensable expression of sympathy, resisting a simple conversion of evolutionary selection into social policy.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1872Fiction · English

Erewhon

Samuel Butler

Tools and agentsMachines may succeed humanityDiminishes

4 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

“We are misled by considering any complicated machine as a single thing; in truth it is a city or society, each member of which was bred truly after its kind. We see a machine as a whole, we call it by a name and individualise it; we look at our own limbs, and know that the combination forms an individual which springs from a single centre of reproductive action; we therefore assume that there can be no reproductive action which does not arise from a single centre; but this assumption is unscientific, and the bare fact that no vapour-engine was ever made entirely by another, or two others, of its own kind, is not sufficient to warrant us in saying that vapour-engines have no reproductive system. The truth is that each part of every vapour-engine is bred by its own special breeders, whose function it is to breed that part, and that only, while the combination of the parts into a whole forms another department of the mechanical reproductive system, which is at present exceedingly complex and difficult to see in its entirety.”
Local word range 66386–66810passage classificationsource wording still to be checked

The passage argues that machines should be understood as organized reproductive systems rather than as isolated human instruments. By analogy with biological reproduction and evolution, it opens the possibility that machines may develop and succeed humanity. The surrounding argument treats this prospect as a future danger requiring human vigilance, though the excerpt itself mainly establishes the analogy rather than describing an explicit conflict of machine and human purposes.

Passage 2 · English

There is no security […] against the ultimate development of mechanical consciousness, in the fact of machines possessing little consciousness now. A mollusc has not much consciousness. Reflect upon the extraordinary advance which machines have made during the last few hundred years, and note how slowly the animal and vegetable kingdoms are advancing. […] May not the world last twenty million years longer? If so, what will they not in the end become? Is it not safer to nip the mischief in the bud and to forbid them further progress? […] But who can say that the vapour engine has not a kind of consciousness? Where does consciousness begin, and where end? Who can draw the line?
Chapter XXIII, ‘The Book of the Machines’ (fictional treatise reported by the narrator)passage classification

The narrator reports an Erewhonian argument that evolutionary development may produce mechanical consciousness and make prevention prudent; the fiction requires `reports`, while retaining its conceptual force.

Passage 3 · English

But I have heard it said, ‘granted that this is so, and that the vapour-engine has a strength of its own, surely no one will say that it has a will of its own?’ Alas! if we look more closely, we shall find that this does not make against the supposition that the vapour-engine is one of the germs of a new phase of life. What is there in this whole world, or in the worlds beyond it, which has a will of its own? The Unknown and Unknowable only! ‘A man is the resultant and exponent of all the forces that have been brought to bear upon him, whether before his birth or afterwards. His action at any moment depends solely upon his constitution, and on the intensity and direction of the various agencies to which he is, and has been, subjected. […] so will he do, as certainly and regularly as though he were a machine.’
Chapter XXIV, ‘The Machines—continued’ (fictional treatise reported by the narrator)passage classification

The reported treatise makes human determinism an analogy for treating the steam engine as nascent life, entwining machine standing with a determinist account of human will.

Passage 4 · English

But returning to the argument, I would repeat that I fear none of the existing machines; what I fear is the extraordinary rapidity with which they are becoming something very different to what they are at present. No class of beings have in any time past made so rapid a movement forward. Should not that movement be jealously watched, and checked while we can still check it? And is it not necessary for this end to destroy the more advanced of the machines which are in use at present, though it is admitted that they are in themselves harmless? […] we cannot calculate on any corresponding advance in man’s intellectual or physical powers which shall be a set-off against the far greater development which seems in store for the machines.
Chapter XXIII, ‘The Book of the Machines’ (fictional treatise reported by the narrator)passage classification

The passage reports a precautionary argument: even presently harmless machines should be checked because their development may outstrip human capacities and become irreversible.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1874Philosophy · English

On the Hypothesis That Animals Are Automata, and Its History

T. H. Huxley

Free will and automatismChoice accompanies mechanical causesDiminishes

3 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

It may be assumed, then, that molecular changes in the brain are the causes of all the states of consciousness of brutes. Is there any evidence that these states of consciousness may, conversely, cause those molecular changes which give rise to muscular motion? I see no such evidence. The frog walks, hops, swims, and goes through his gymnastic performances quite as well without consciousness, and consequently without volition, as with it; and, if a frog, in his natural state, possesses anything corresponding with what we call volition, there is no reason to think that it is anything but a concomitant of the molecular changes in the brain which form part of the series involved in the production of motion. The consciousness of brutes would appear to be related to the mechanism of their body simply as a collateral product of its working, and to be as completely without any power of modifying that working as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery. Their volition, if they have any, is an emotion indicative of physical changes, not a cause of such changes.
Local word range 61061–61485passage classification

Huxley argues that brain processes cause consciousness and movement, while consciousness is only a collateral product with no power to alter bodily action. Volition therefore indicates physical changes rather than causing them, presenting a clear conscious-automaton theory that diminishes the causal role of choice.

Passage 2 · English

It is quite true that, to the best of my judgment, the argumentation which applies to brutes holds equally good of men; and, therefore, that all states of consciousness in us, as in them, are immediately caused by molecular changes of the brain-substance. It seems to me that in men, as in brutes, there is no proof that any state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of the matter of the organism. If these positions are well based, it follows that our mental conditions are simply the symbols in consciousness of the changes which take place automatically in the organism; and that, to take an extreme illustration, the feeling we call volition is not the cause of a voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which is the immediate cause of that act. We are conscious automata, endowed with free will in the only intelligible sense of that much-abused term—inasmuch as in many respects we are able to do as we like—but none the less parts of the great series of causes and effects which, in unbroken continuity, composes that which is, and has been, and shall be—the sum of existence.
Final argument, ‘The argumentation which applies to brutes holds equally good of men’passage classification

Huxley extends physiological automatism to human beings but defines freedom as acting according to one’s desires despite their causal determination; this is a genuine compatibilist tension, not merely a denial of freedom.

Passage 3 · English

It may be assumed, then, that molecular changes in the brain are the causes of all the states of consciousness of brutes. Is there any evidence that these states of consciousness may, conversely, cause those molecular changes which give rise to muscular motion? I see no such evidence. The frog walks, hops, swims, and goes through his gymnastic performances quite as well without consciousness, and consequently without volition, as with it; and, if a frog, in his natural state, possesses anything corresponding with what we call volition, there is no reason to think that it is anything but a concomitant of the molecular changes in the brain which form part of the series involved in the production of motion. The consciousness of brutes would appear to be related to the mechanism of their body simply as a collateral product of its working, and to be as completely without any power of modifying that working as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery. Their volition, if they have any, is an emotion indicative of physical changes, not a cause of such changes.
Section on brute consciousness and volitionpassage classification

Huxley treats consciousness and volition as effects or signs of brain processes rather than causes of movement, using physiological comparison to formulate his epiphenomenalist position.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1874Science or medicine · English

The Principles of Science, vol. I

William Stanley Jevons

Tools and agentsreasoning as reckoningNo judgment

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

Although the Logical Abacus considerably reduced the labour of using the Indirect Method, it was not free from the possibility of error. I thought moreover that it would afford a conspicuous proof of the generality and power of the method if I could reduce it to a purely mechanical form. … It seemed strange that in the more intricate science of quantity mechanism could be applicable, whereas in the simple science of qualitative reasoning, the syllogism was only by analogy or simile called an Instrument. … [Smee's designs] do not attempt the performance of logical inference.
Vol. I, ch. VI, "The Logical Machine," pp. 123–124passage classification

Jevons treats formal logical inference as a process whose generality can be demonstrated by mechanical realization, not as evidence that a machine has independent purposes or personhood.

Passage 2 · English

After the Finis key has been used the machine represents a mind endowed with powers of thought, but wholly devoid of knowledge. … The machine is thus the embodiment of a true logical system. The combinations are classified, selected or rejected just as they should be by a reasoning mind. … It cannot be asserted indeed that the machine entirely supersedes the agency of conscious thought; mental labour is required in interpreting the meaning of grammatical expressions and in correctly impressing that meaning on the machine; it is further required in gathering the conclusion from the remaining combinations. Nevertheless the true process of logical inference is actually accomplished in a purely mechanical manner.
Vol. I, ch. VI, "The Logical Machine," pp. 127–128passage classification

Jevons's precise mixed position is that inference proper is mechanical, while humans still supply semantic interpretation, correct encoding, and extraction of the conclusion.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1879Science or medicine · English

Are We Automata?

William James

Cognition, attention, and judgmentselection and judgmentEnlarges

4 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

That these eddies are stirred by causes that have no connection with either dominant interests or present impressions seems manifest from the phenomena of dreaming. The chaotic imagery there appears due to the unequal stimulus of nutrition in different localities. But if an accidental variation in nutrition is sufficient to determine the brain's action, what safeguard have we at any time against its random influence? It may of course be reasonably objected that the exceptional state of sleep can afford no proper clue to the brain's operations when awake. But Maury in his classic work, Le Sommeil, has conclusively proved the passage of dreams through "hypnagogic hallucinations" into that meteoric shower of images and suggestions, irrelevant to the main line of thought, the continual presence of which every one who has once had his interest awakened in the subject, will without difficulty recognise in himself. Ordinarily these perish in being born, but if one by chance saunters into the mind, which is related to the dominant pursuit of the moment, presto! it is pounced upon and becomes part of the empirical Ego. The greatest inventions, the most brilliant thoughts often turn up thus accidentally, but may mould for all that the future of the man. Would they have gained this prominence above their peers without the watchful eye of consciousness to recognise their value and emphasise them into permanence?
Are We Automata? · line 452passage classification

James grants accidental physiological origins for ideas, but makes consciousness decisive in recognizing, valuing, and preserving the ideas that become part of a life.

Passage 2 · English

This category might be defined as the mode in which data are brought together for comparison with a view to choice. Both these points, comparison and choice, will be found alike omnipresent in the different stages of its activity. The former has always been recognised; the latter less than it deserves. ... I think we may go farther and add that the powers of cognition, discrimination and comparison which it possesses, exist only for the sake of something beyond themselves, namely, Selection.
pp. 8–9, consciousness as comparison and selectionpassage classification

James makes selection and choice a positive, active function of consciousness rather than a by-product of neural sequence.

Passage 3 · English

Ascending still higher we reach the plane of Ethics, where choice reigns notoriously supreme. An act has no ethical quality whatever unless it be chosen out of several all equally possible. To sustain the arguments for the good course and keep them ever before us, to stifle longing for more flowery ways, to keep the foot unflinchingly on the arduous path, these are characteristic ethical energies. But, more than these; for these but deal with the means of compassing interests already felt by the man to be supreme. The ethical energy par excellence has to go farther and choose which interest out of several equally coercive shall become supreme. The issue here is of the utmost pregnancy, for it decides a man's entire career. When he debates, Shall I commit this crime? choose that profession? accept that office, or marry this fortune? -- his choice really lies between one of several equally possible future Selves. What his entire empirical Ego shall become, is fixed by the conduct of this moment.
pp. 13–14, ethical choice and future selvespassage classification

This distinct ethical unit presents deliberate choice as forming a self over time, rather than merely selecting an already determined act.

Passage 4 · English

The power of choosing the light name for the case is the true moral energy involved, and all who posit moral ends must agree in the supreme utility of, at least, this kind of selective attention. But this is only one instance of that substitution for the entire phenomenon of one of its partial aspects which is the essence of all reasoned thought as distinguished from mere habitual association. The utility of reasoned thought is too enormous to need demonstration. A reasoning animal can reach its ends by paths on which the light of previous experience has never shone.
pp. 20–21, selective attention, moral energy, and reasonpassage classification

James joins attention, moral self-command, and reasoning: judgment actively frames what a situation is, rather than following habitual association.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1879speculative fiction · Spanish

Horacio Kalibang o los automatas

Eduardo Ladislao Holmberg

Free will and automatismMade beings may deserve moral standingNo judgment

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · Spanish

¿Qué es el cerebro, sino una gran máquina, cuyos exquisitos resortes se mueven en virtud de impulsos mil y mil veces transformados? ¿Qué es el alma, sino el conjunto de esas funciones mecánicas? La acción físico-química del estímulo sanguíneo, la transmisión nerviosa, la idea, en su carácter imponderable e intangible, no son sino estados diversos de una misma materia.
Printed p. 12, Oscar Baum's materialist account of brain and soulpassage classification

The materialist account is spoken by Baum, not simply adopted by Holmberg; the fiction stages its apparent explanatory force before destabilizing it.

Passage 2 · Spanish

Cuando Luisa tenga hijos, esa máquina humana les enseñará, con métodos especiales, todo lo que deban aprender. ... Tengo el mundo en mis manos, porque lo manejo con mis autómatas.
Final letter, artificial people as education and social-control infrastructurepassage classification

The final reveal turns artificial people into an infrastructure for education and social control; its critical force is authorial staging, not an adopted program.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1879Politics or economics · English

Progress and Poverty

Henry George

Labour and mechanizationHuman institutions create the dangerDiminishes

3 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

The effect of inventions and improvements in the productive arts is to save labor—that is, to enable the same result to be secured with less labor, or a greater result with the same labor. … [W]hile the primary effect of labor-saving improvements is to increase the power of labor, the secondary effect is to extend cultivation, and, where this lowers the margin of cultivation, to increase rent. Thus, where land is entirely appropriated … the ultimate effect of labor-saving machinery or improvements is to increase rent without increasing wages or interest. … [T]his … explains the otherwise perplexing fact that labor-saving machinery everywhere fails to benefit laborers.
Book IV, ch. III, "The Effect of Improvements in the Arts upon the Distribution of Wealth," pp. 242–243passage classification

George locates the harm not in machinery as an autonomous agent but in land appropriation and distribution: technical gains increase rent while labour fails to share them.

Passage 2 · English

And, as we can assign no limits to the progress of invention, neither can we assign any limits to the increase of rent, short of the whole produce. For, if labor-saving inventions went on until perfection was attained, and the necessity of labor in the production of wealth was entirely done away with, then everything that the earth could yield could be obtained without labor. … Wages would be nothing, and interest would be nothing, while rent would take everything. For the owners of the land, being enabled without labor to obtain all the wealth that could be procured from nature, there would be no use for either labor or capital, and no possible way in which either could compel any share of the wealth produced.
Book IV, ch. III, "The Effect of Improvements in the Arts upon the Distribution of Wealth," pp. 249–250passage classification

The deliberately extreme automation scenario makes George's institutional claim vivid: if productive power is privately captured, labour's disappearance makes non-owners dependent on owners' discretion.

Passage 3 · English

Mind is the instrument by which man advances, and by which each advance is secured and made the vantage ground for new advances. … Mental power is, therefore, the motor of progress. … [A]ssociation is the first essential of progress. Improvement becomes possible as men come together in peaceful association, and the wider and closer the association, the greater the possibilities of improvement. And as the wasteful expenditure of mental power in conflict becomes greater or less as the moral law which accords to each an equality of rights is ignored or is recognized, equality (or justice) is the second essential of progress. Thus association in equality is the law of progress.
Book X, ch. III, "The Law of Human Progress," pp. 503–506passage classification

George rejects automatic progress: collective advancement depends on equal social relations that release human mental power for shared improvement.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1879book · English

Society the Redeemed Form of Man

Henry James Sr.

Free will and automatismThe will can direct actionEnlarges

3 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

Our race-destiny is thoroughly incapable, I am happy to say, of furnishing a destiny for the individual man. We are not the race, but individuals embraced in it; and though there is beyond doubt a race-destiny for man, there is no such thing as an individual destiny. Human individuality is constituted by freedom and rationality; and if therefore a certain destiny were imposed upon it to fulfil, either by deity or demon, it would immediately collapse. ... the individual man, because he is by creation free and rational, is ipso facto the arbiter of his own spiritual life and character.
Letter 1, pp. 5–6, individual freedom and destinypassage classification

James Sr. equates imposed destiny with the collapse of individual agency, grounding effective freedom in a theological account of personhood.

Passage 2 · English

I have no sort of a suspicion, until I receive my information from others, that I am then meanwhile, in spite of my apparent selfhood or freedom, the wretched slave of my personal organization. It seems at this period so like free action to give way to my appetites and passions regardless of any higher law, and my nascent unripe sense of selfhood or personality is so fostered by it, that I cannot help yielding for a while to the deceptive seeming: but it is wholly a seeming, destitute of the least vital truth.
Letter 1, pp. 8–9, apparent freedom as bondagepassage classification

The passage complicates simple voluntarism: what feels like freedom can be bondage to inherited appetite and personal organization.

Passage 3 · English

Our natural evolution, or our race-destiny, is to put on Divine form and order; and this form and order undeniably consist in each man seeking supremely the good of the whole, and in all men seeking supremely the good of each. It is manifest then that the regenerate person does indirectly promote this race-evolution, inasmuch as he alone freely abstains from conflict with his fellowman.
Letter 1, pp. 10–11, race-evolution and reciprocal social goodpassage classification

His freedom is not atomistic: individual regeneration is linked to a collective, reciprocal social order.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1881Philosophy · English

Symbolic Logic

John Venn

Tools and agentscalculation is insufficientNo judgment

1 selected passage · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

It is but a very small part of the entire process, which goes to form a piece of reasoning, which they are capable of performing. For, if we begin from the beginning, that process would involve four tolerably distinct steps. There is, first, the statement of our data in accurate logical language. This step deserves to be reckoned, since the variations of popular language are so multitudinous, and often so vague and ambiguous, that they may need careful consideration before they can be reduced to form. Then, secondly, we have to throw these statements into a form fit for the engine to work with — in this case the reduction of each proposition to its elementary denials. [...] Thirdly, there is the combination or further treatment of our premises after such reduction. Finally, the results have to be interpreted or read off. This last generally gives rise to much opening for skill and sagacity; [...] it then becomes a question of judgment which of these is the simplest and best. [...] I cannot see that any machine can hope to help us except in the third of these steps; so that it seems very doubtful whether any thing of this sort really deserves the name of a logical engine.
Symbolic Logic (1881), ch. V, pp. 119–121passage classification

Venn separates reasoning into problem formulation, machine preparation, formal combination, and interpretation. He limits machinery to the third step; exact language and interpretive choice remain human work.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1883Fiction · French

Ignis

Didier de Chousy

Machine minds and made personsMachine minds may emergeDiminishes

3 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · French

On a déjà reconnu la race pseudo-humaine conçue par lord Hotairwell et mise au monde par ses habiles ingénieurs : les Enginemen, ou plutôt les Atmophytes, car cette dernière appellation avait prévalu ; les phytes ruraux, grossiers paysans, aussi inférieurs à leurs collègues de la ville que le valet de ferme qui panse le cheval est inférieur au valet de chambre qui panse l’homme. Ces derniers seulement méritent le nom d’Atmophytes (hommes-vapeur), car on ne saurait appeler animaux ou machines des fac-simile d’hommes aussi ressemblants à leurs créateurs, doués d’une sorte d’âme et de rouages supérieurs à des membres ; hommes de fer et de cuivre, semblables à des scaphandres ou à des chevaliers dans leur armure ; corps en qui la vapeur s’est substituée au sang, dont l’électricité anime le mécanisme si affiné, si subtil, si imprégné de génie humain, qu’il s’immalérialise par lavirtuosité de sa matière, et que ses gestes ressemblent moins à des produits de la force qu’à des manifestations de la vie. Créatures assez parfaites pour inquiéter leurs créateurs, si quelque jour ces êtres étranges dépassant, par leur vitesse acquise, l’étroite frontière où l’intelligence confine à l’instinct, essayaient à leur tour d’escalader le ciel, d’étouffer sur leurs poitrines de bronze leurs maîtres éperdus, et de rendre à leur poussière natale, les idoles d’argile humaine qu’ils avaient prises pour des dieux !

Working English translation

The pseudo-human race conceived by Lord Hotairwell and brought into the world by his able engineers has already been identified: the Enginemen, or rather the Atmophytes, since the latter name prevailed; the rural phytes, crude peasants, as inferior to their urban colleagues as the farmhand who tends the horse is inferior to the valet who tends the man. Only the latter deserve the name Atmophytes (steam-men), for one could not call animals or machines such facsimiles of men, so much do they resemble their creators, endowed with a sort of soul and with mechanisms superior to limbs; men of iron and copper, like divers’ suits or knights in armour; bodies in which steam has replaced blood, whose electricity animates a mechanism so refined, subtle, and imbued with human genius that it becomes immaterial through the virtuosity of its matter, and whose gestures resemble less products of force than manifestations of life. Creatures perfect enough to alarm their creators, if one day these strange beings, surpassing through acquired speed the narrow frontier where intelligence borders on instinct, should in turn try to climb the sky, crush their distraught masters against their bronze breasts, and return to their native dust the human clay idols they had taken for gods!
Local word range 48281–48705passage classificationsource wording still to be checked

The passage presents engineered agricultural beings as human-like creations with a sort of soul and life-like intelligence, rather than merely animals or machines. It then warns that their developed capacities could carry them beyond their creators and allow them to overpower humanity. Their origin as designed labourers also frames mechanization as a possible route to human displacement and loss of control.

Passage 2 · French

Le feu central, Monsieur le Comte, est, par nature et par destination, un patrimoine indivis entre l’humanité, un feu d’intérêt commun, qui ne peut être la proie du premier occupant, parce qu’il est déjà occupé. [...] Ces prémisses établies, il en découle la conséquence que l’exploitation du feu terrestre ne saurait être le monopole d’une compagnie, d’un royaume, d’un continent ; qu’elle ne peut être légitimement entreprise que d’un commun accord entre les ayants droit, après une enquête de commodo et incommodo, à la suite d’une conférence internationale d’hommes spéciaux qui, pour s’éclairer des lumières acquises par les travaux déjà faits, se réuniront en Irlande, et siégeront soit à l’orifice, soit au fond du puits commencé. Ces mandataires de tous les pays feront à chacun la part du feu, détermineront le mode de sa jouissance, fixeront sa quotité disponible suivant l’étendue des territoires, et partageront également le dessous des mers, au prorata des continents.
Ignis (1883), scan pp. 175–176passage classification

The novel stages a counter-case to private technical extraction: a shared planetary resource requires collective governance, inquiry, and distribution.

Passage 3 · French

— La science doit avoir des limites ? objectai-je en vue de me rassurer. — La science n’a pas de limites, répondit l’ingénieur Archbold. La science est le progrès (progressus) ; la marche en avant, sans halte, sans terme. [...] — C’est une terre cuite, dit à son tour Hatchitt, une terre finie, qui s’effrite, se craquelle, manque de corps et tombe en miettes, une taupinière qu’on éparpillerait dans l’espace, avec un coup de pied de vigueur appropriée ; une terre malade, malpropre et malsaine, qui deviendra moins habitable à mesure que les chemins de fer, les bateaux à vapeur, les puits de feu et les usines, s’étant multipliés, se joindront plus activement aux volcans et aux poitrines humaines, pour exhaler l’oxyde de carbone et l’acide carbonique, que n’absorberont plus les forêts défrichées. L’atmosphère terrestre deviendra aussi obscure qu’un brouillard de Londres, et le genre humain, à tâtons, périra asphyxié dans cette fumée ; ou pis encore, il ne périra pas ; il s’étiolera dans l’étisie, la cachexie et la fièvre.
Ignis (1883), scan pp. 183–186passage classification

By juxtaposing limitless-progress rhetoric with an exaggerated industrial ecological collapse, Chousy stages a rejection of technological harmlessness and a warning of civilizational decline.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1884Public address · English

Useful Work versus Useless Toil

William Morris

Labour and mechanizationHuman institutions create the dangerDiminishes

3 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

As things are now, between the waste of labour-power in mere idleness and its waste in unproductive work, it is clear that the world of civilization is supported by a small part of its people; when all were working usefully for its support, the share of work which each would have to do would be but small, if our standard of life were about on the footing of what well-to-do and refined people now think desirable. We shall have labour-power to spare, and shall, in short, be as wealthy as we please. It will be easy to live. If we were to wake up some morning now, under our present system, and find it "easy to live," that system would force us to set to work at once and make it hard to live; we should call that "developing our resources," or some such fine name. The multiplication of labour has become a necessity for us, and as long as that goes on no ingenuity in the invention of machines will be of any real use to us. Each new machine will cause a certain amount of misery among the workers whose special industry it may disturb; so many of them will be reduced from skilled to unskilled workmen, and then gradually matters will slip into their due grooves, and all will work apparently smoothly again;
Local word range 3551–3975passage classification

Morris argues that under the present economic system machinery cannot genuinely improve life: the multiplication of labour makes it necessary to work more, while new machines disturb workers' industries and reduce skilled workers to unskilled labour. The loss of control and skill is attributed to the social arrangement of production rather than to machines alone.

Passage 2 · English

As to the hope of product, I have said that Nature compels us to work for that. It remains for us to look to it that we do really produce something, and not nothing, or at least nothing that we want or are allowed to use. If we look to this and use our wills we shall, so far, be better than machines. The hope of pleasure in the work itself: how strange that hope must seem to some of my readers — to most of them! Yet I think that to all living things there is a pleasure in the exercise of their energies, and that even beasts rejoice in being lithe and swift and strong. But a man at work, making something which he feels will exist because he is working at it and wills it, is exercising the energies of his mind and soul as well as of his body. Memory and imagination help him as he works. Not only his own thoughts, but the thoughts of the men of past ages guide his hands; and, as a part of the human race, he creates. If we work thus we shall be men, and our days will be happy and eventful. [...] All other work but this is worthless; it is slaves' work — mere toiling to live, that we may live to toil.
Useful Work versus Useless Toil (1884), openingpassage classification

Morris treats work as fully human when it is willed, meaningful, imaginative, and creative; merely compelled toil is slave work.

Passage 3 · English

[T]his cheapness is necessary to the system of exploiting on which modern manufacture rests. In other words, our society includes a great mass of slaves, who must be fed, clothed, housed and amused as slaves, and that their daily necessity compels them to make the slave-wares whose use is the perpetuation of their slavery. [...] Thus then have the fruits of our victory over Nature been stolen from us, thus has compulsion by Nature to labour in hope of rest, gain, and pleasure been turned into compulsion by man to labour in hope — of living to labour! What shall we do then, can we mend it? Well, remember once more that it is not our remote ancestors who achieved the victory over Nature, but our fathers, nay, our very selves. For us to sit hopeless and helpless then would be a strange folly indeed: be sure that we can amend it.
Useful Work versus Useless Toil (1884), later argumentpassage classification

Morris locates the loss of autonomy in capitalist organization, not machinery alone: class power diverts productive capacity into exploitative, unproductive work.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1885book · English

Introduction to The Literary Remains of the Late Henry James

William James

Not yet classified

Original · English

" The logic of the case is inexorable. If creation at its culmination be an exact practical equation of creator and creature, scruple to endow him with moral consciousness, it would withhold from him all conscious life or joy, and leave him a mere form of vegetative existence. Creation', to allow of any true fellowship or equality between creator and creature, demands that the creature be himself, — that is, be naturally posited to his own consciousness. And he cannot be thus posited save in so -far as the creative love vivifies his essential destitution, organizes it in living form, and by the experience thus engendered in the created bosom lays a basis for any amount of free or spiritual reaction in the creature towards the uncreated good.

A man of science assembles a living creature from dead matter; it wakes, reasons, and demands of its maker a mate and a place among men. What does a maker owe the mind he has made?

Introduction · p. 29 · line 524repository text checkedsource is in English

Not yet classified in the current schema

1890Philosophy · English

The Principles of Psychology

William James

Free will and automatismMachines remain toolsEnlarges

8 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

The organs themselves, and all the rest of the physical world, will, however, all the time be quite indifferent to this consequence, and would quite as cheerfully, the circumstances changed, compass the animal’s destruction. In a word, survival can enter into a purely physiological discussion only as an hypothesis made by an onlooker, about the future. But the moment you bring a consciousness into the midst, survival ceases to be a mere hypothesis. No longer is it, ‘if survival is to occur, then so and so must brain and other organs work.’ It has now become an imperative decree: ‘Survival shall occur, and therefore organs must so work!’ Real ends appear for the first time now upon the world’s stage. The conception of consciousness as a purely cognitive form of being, which is the pet way of regarding it in many idealistic schools, modern as well as ancient, is thoroughly anti-psychological, as the remainder of this book will show. Every actually existing consciousness seems to itself at any rate to be a fighter for ends, of which many, but for its presence, would not be ends at all. Its powers of cognition are mainly subservient to these ends, discerning which facts further them and which do not. Now let consciousness only be what it seems to itself, and it will help an instable brain to compass its proper ends. The movements of the brain per se yield the means of attaining these ends mechanically, but only out of a lot of other ends, if so they may be called, which are not the proper ones of the animal, but often quite opposed. The brain is an instrument of possibilities, but of no certainties. But the consciousness, with its own ends present to it, and knowing also well which possibilities lead thereto and which away, will, if endowed with causal efficacy, reinforce the favorable possibilities and repress the unfavorable or indifferent ones. The nerve-currents, coursing through the cells and fibres, must in this case be supposed strengthened by the fact of their awaking one consciousness and dampened by awaking another. How such reaction of the consciousness upon the currents may occur must remain at present unsolved: it is enough for my purpose to have shown that it may not uselessly exist, and that the matter is less simple than the brain-automatists hold.
Chapter V, ‘The Automaton-Theory,’ pp. 141–42passage classification

James distinguishes a physical brain, which supplies possible routes, from consciousness, which creates ends, selects among alternatives, and can make the routes serving its ends more effective. He therefore rejects the view that consciousness is a causally idle accompaniment of brain activity.

Passage 2 · English

Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent. It alone is what keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the envious uprisings of the poor. It alone prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of life from being deserted by those brought up to tread therein. It keeps the fisherman and the deck-hand at sea through the winter; it holds the miner in his darkness, and nails the countryman to his log-cabin and his lonely farm through all the months of snow; it protects us from invasion by the natives of the desert and the frozen zone. It dooms us all to fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our nurture or our early choice, and to make the best of a pursuit that disagrees, because there is no other for which we are fitted, and it is too late to begin again.
Chapter IV, “Habit”passage classification

James depicts habit as both the collective mechanism that stabilizes social life and the force that fixes people into inherited occupations and social positions.

Passage 3 · English

The great thing, then, in all education, is to make our nervous system our ally instead of our enemy. It is to fund and capitalize our acquisitions, and live at ease upon the interest of the fund. For this we must make automatic and habitual, as early as possible, as many useful actions as we can, and guard against the growing into ways that are likely to be disadvantageous to us, as we should guard against the plague. The more of the details of our daily life we can hand over to the effortless custody of automatism, the more our higher powers of mind will be set free for their own proper work.
Chapter IV, “Habit”passage classification

James treats well-formed automatism as a cultivated support for agency: routinized useful actions release attention and higher capacities rather than simply replacing them.

Passage 4 · English

Millions of items of the outward order are present to my senses which never properly enter into my experience. Why? Because they have no interest for me. My experience is what I agree to attend to. Only those items which I notice shape my mind--without selective interest, experience is an utter chaos. Interest alone gives accent and emphasis, light and shade, background and foreground--intelligible perspective, in a word.
Chapter XI, “Attention”passage classification

Experience is not a passive intake of available stimuli: selective attention organizes a meaningful world by determining what enters experience and shapes the mind.

Passage 5 · English

The essential achievement of the will, in short, when it is most 'voluntary,' is to ATTEND to a difficult object and hold it fast before the mind. The so-doing is the fiat; and it is a mere physiological incident that when the object is thus attended to, immediate motor consequences should ensue. A resolve, whose contemplated motor consequences are not to ensue until some possibly far distant future condition shall have been fulfilled, involves all the psychic elements of a motor fiat except the word 'now'; and it is the same with many of our purely theoretic beliefs.
Chapter XXVI, “The Will”passage classification

James identifies voluntary willing with the effort to keep a difficult object before the mind, treating attention as the practical act that makes action and commitment possible.

Passage 6 · English

The strong-willed man, however, is the man who hears the still small voice unflinchingly, and who, when the death-bringing consideration comes, looks at its face, consents to its presence, clings to it, affirms it, and holds it fast, in spite of the host of exciting mental images which rise in revolt against it and would expel it from the mind. Sustained in this way by a resolute effort of attention, the difficult object erelong begins to call up its own congeners and associates and ends by changing the disposition of the man's consciousness altogether. And with his consciousness, his action changes, for the new object, once stably in possession of the field of his thoughts, infallibly produces its own motor effects.
Chapter XXVI, “The Will”passage classification

Strong will is a trainable form of self-command: sustained attention can reorganize consciousness and thereby alter the action that follows.

Passage 7 · English

Every actually existing consciousness seems to itself at any rate to be a fighter for ends, of which many, but for its presence, would not be ends at all. Its powers of cognition are mainly subservient to these ends, discerning which facts further them and which do not. Now let consciousness only be what it seems to itself, and it will help an instable brain to compass its proper ends. The movements of the brain per se yield the means of attaining these ends mechanically, but only out of a lot of other ends, if so they may be called, which are not the proper ones of the animal, but often quite opposed. The brain is an instrument of possibilities, but of no certainties. But the consciousness, with its own ends present to it, and knowing also well which possibilities lead thereto and which away, will, if endowed with causal efficacy, reinforce the favorable possibilities and repress the unfavorable or indifferent ones.
Chapter V, “The Automaton-Theory,” pp. 141–42passage classification

James argues that consciousness makes a causal difference by selecting among mechanically available possibilities in light of an organism’s ends.

Passage 8 · English

All the facts of the natural history of consciousness lend color to this view. Consciousness, for example, is only intense when nerve-processes are hesitant. In rapid, automatic, habitual action it sinks to a minimum. Nothing could be more fitting than this, if consciousness have the teleological function we suppose; nothing more meaningless, if not. Habitual actions are certain, and being in no danger of going astray from their end, need no extraneous help. In hesitant action, there seem many alternative possibilities of final nervous discharge. The feeling awakened by the nascent excitement of each alternative nerve-tract seems by its attractive or repulsive quality to determine whether the excitement shall abort or shall become complete. Where indecision is great, as before a dangerous leap, consciousness is agonizingly intense. Feeling, from this point of view, may be likened to a cross-section of the chain of nervous discharge, ascertaining the links already laid down, and groping among the fresh ends presented to it for the one which seems best to fit the case.
Chapter V, “The Automaton-Theory,” pp. 142–43passage classification

James contrasts automatic habit with moments of hesitation, where feeling and consciousness select among genuinely competing courses of action.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1892book · English

Psychology (Briefer Course)

William James

Cognition, attention, and judgmentselection and judgmentEnlarges

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

And yet our consciousness is there, and has in all probability been evolved, like all other functions, for a use — it is to the highest degree improbable a priori that it should have no use. Its use seems to be that of selection; but to select, it must be efficacious. States of consciousness which feel right are held fast to; those which feel wrong are checked. If the ‘holding’ and the ‘checking’ of the conscious states severally mean also the efficacious reinforcing or inhibiting of the correlated neural processes, then it would seem as if the presence of the states of mind might help to steer the nervous system and keep it in the path which to the consciousness seemed best. Now on the average what seems best to consciousness is really best for the creature.
Chapter VIII, “The Functions of the Brain,” pp. 103–04passage classification

The Briefer Course makes selection consciousness’s evolutionary function: holding and checking mental states are proposed as causally steering neural activity.

Passage 2 · English

Volitional effort is effort of attention. We thus find that we reach the heart of our inquiry into volition when we ask by what process it is that the thought of any given action comes to prevail stably in the mind. Where thoughts prevail without effort, we have sufficiently studied in the several chapters on Sensation, Association, and Attention, the laws of their advent before consciousness and of their stay. We shall not go over that ground again, for we know that interest and association are the words, let their worth be what they may, on which our explanations must perforce rely. Where, on the other hand, the prevalence of the thought is accompanied by the phenomenon of effort, the case is much less clear. Already in the chapter on Attention we postponed the final consideration of voluntary attention with effort to a later place. We have now brought things to a point at which we see that attention with effort is all that any case of volition implies. The essential achievement of the will, in short, when it is most ‘voluntary,’ is to attend to a difficult object and hold it fast before the mind.
Chapter XXVI, “Will,” pp. 450–52passage classification

James identifies the will with the disciplined effort to keep a difficult idea present, making attention the practical site of agency.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1894Science or medicine · French

Psychologie des grands calculateurs et joueurs d'echecs

Alfred Binet

Cognition, attention, and judgmentselection and judgmentNo judgment

1 selected passage · each coded separately

Passage 1 · French

M. Inaudi, qui présente un développement exceptionnel d'une seule espèce de mémoire, la mémoire des chiffres. C'est ce dont on s'aperçoit facilement lorsqu'on compare chez lui deux choses presque identiques, la mémoire des chiffres et la mémoire des lettres. [...] Sa mémoire des chiffres — que nous allons examiner tout à l'heure méthodiquement — est près de cent fois supérieure à la moyenne ; sa mémoire des lettres est faible : il est incapable de répéter plus de cinq à six lettres ; même impuissance pour répéter deux lignes de prose ou de vers. [...] Il n'y a qu'un seul cas où il se rappelle exactement une suite de mots : c'est quand ces mots font partie de l'énoncé d'un problème. Ceci est intéressant et montre combien l'attention et l'exercice sont des facteurs importants dans la formation des mémoires partielles ; cette formation ne repose probablement pas, selon nous, sur un fait anatomique, mais bien sur un fait psychologique; nous entendons par là que ce qui produit le développement d'une mémoire, c'est — outre une condition physiologique inconnue — un ensemble de facultés mentales, l'attention, la volonté, la persévérance et par-dessus tout un goût passionné pour le genre d'études qui est en connexion avec cette mémoire. Lorsqu'on parcourt les études biographiques qui ont été publiées jusqu'à ce jour sur les calculateurs prodiges, on s'aperçoit que les auteurs n'ont point fait cette distinction importante entre la mémoire et le calcul; surtout ils n'ont pas cherché à prendre une mesure de la mémoire.
Part I, chapter IV, “M. Inaudi — Mémoire des chiffres,” pp. 43–45passage classification

Binet treats extraordinary calculation as a specific, trainable organization of memory and attention, and insists on separating the capacity to retain figures from calculation itself.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1895Science or medicine · English translation

The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind

Gustave Le Bon

Crowds, media, and public opinionChoice accompanies mechanical causesDiminishes

3 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English translation

In its ordinary sense the word "crowd" means a gathering of individuals of whatever nationality, profession, or sex, and whatever be the chances that have brought them together. From the psychological point of view the expression "crowd" assumes quite a different signification. Under certain given circumstances, and only under those circumstances, an agglomeration of men presents new characteristics very different from those of the individuals composing it. The sentiments and ideas of all the persons in the gathering take one and the same direction, and their conscious personality vanishes. A collective mind is formed, doubtless transitory, but presenting very clearly defined characteristics. The gathering has thus become what, in the absence of a better expression, I will call an organised crowd, or, if the term is considered preferable, a psychological crowd. It forms a single being, and is subjected to the LAW OF THE MENTAL UNITY OF CROWDS.
MENTAL UNITY.; local word range 4261–4685passage classification

Le Bon argues that under particular conditions individuals in a psychological crowd lose their conscious personalities, while their thoughts and feelings converge into a collective mind. The passage therefore presents crowd formation as diminishing individual judgment and agency, using a quasi-psychological explanatory framework.

Passage 2 · English translation

Under certain given circumstances, and only under those circumstances, an agglomeration of men presents new characteristics very different from those of the individuals composing it. The sentiments and ideas of all the persons in the gathering take one and the same direction, and their conscious personality vanishes. A collective mind is formed, doubtless transitory, but presenting very clearly defined characteristics. The gathering has thus become what, in the absence of a better expression, I will call an organised crowd, or, if the term is considered preferable, a psychological crowd. It forms a single being, and is subjected to the LAW OF THE MENTAL UNITY OF CROWDS.
Book I, chapter 1, “General Characteristics of Crowds”passage classification

Le Bon's crowd is a temporary collective mind in which converging sentiments displace individual conscious personality.

Passage 3 · English translation

We see, then, that the disappearance of the conscious personality, the predominance of the unconscious personality, the turning by means of suggestion and contagion of feelings and ideas in an identical direction, the tendency to immediately transform the suggested ideas into acts; these, we see, are the principal characteristics of the individual forming part of a crowd. He is no longer himself, but has become an automaton who has ceased to be guided by his will.
Book I, chapter 1, section on suggestion and contagionpassage classification

The individual in a crowd becomes, for Le Bon, an automaton: suggestion is converted directly into action and will no longer guides conduct.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1895Fiction · English

The Time Machine

H. G. Wells

Progress and declineReports: Machines pose no inherent dangerDiminishes

1 selected passage · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

So I travelled, stopping ever and again, in great strides of a thousand years or more, drawn on by the mystery of the earth’s fate, watching with a strange fascination the sun grow larger and duller in the westward sky, and the life of the old earth ebb away. At last, more than thirty million years hence, the huge red-hot dome of the sun had come to obscure nearly a tenth part of the darkling heavens. Then I stopped once more, for the crawling multitude of crabs had disappeared, and the red beach, save for its livid green liverworts and lichens, seemed lifeless.
Chapter XIV, “The Further Vision”passage classification

Wells extends decline beyond social arrangements to a cosmic horizon: the Earth's life ebbs under an aging sun, beyond any human intervention.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1897utopian fiction · Italian

L'anno 3000

Paolo Mantegazza

Heredity and biological controlHuman institutions create the dangerDiminishes

1 selected passage · each coded separately

Passage 1 · Italian

Abbiamo poi la più alta gerarchia fra i medici, quella degli Igei, che studiano gli organismi sani, per spiare prima dello sviluppo della malattia la disposizione ad ammalare; e sono essi che visitano i neonati per verificare se sono atti alla vita. Anche fra essi si è formata una sottospecialità, che è quella dei Psicoigei, che come vedremo fra poco, constatano nel neonato le future attitudini al delitto, onde sopprimere i delinquenti, prima ch’essi possano recar danno alla società in cui son nati.
Chapter on Igeia, p. 191passage classification

Mantegazza imagines preventive medical governance that predicts criminal disposition at birth and eliminates its subjects before any act, making technical foresight an instrument of coercion.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1897Philosophy · English

The Will to Believe and Other Essays

William James

Free will and automatismConsiders: Choice accompanies mechanical causesNo judgment

3 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

Now, all this is a quagmire of evasion under which the real issue of fact has been entirely smothered. Freedom in all these senses presents simply no problem at all. No matter what the soft determinist mean by it,--whether he mean the acting without external constraint; whether he mean the acting rightly, or whether he mean the acquiescing in the law of the whole,--who cannot answer him that sometimes we are free and sometimes we are not? But there _is_ a problem, an issue of fact and not of words, an issue of the most momentous importance, which is often decided without discussion in one sentence,--nay, in one clause of a sentence,--by those very writers who spin out whole chapters in their efforts to show {150} what 'true' freedom is; and that is the question of determinism, about which we are to talk to-night. Fortunately, no ambiguities hang about this word or about its opposite, indeterminism. Both designate an outward way in which things may happen, and their cold and mathematical sound has no sentimental associations that can bribe our partiality either way in advance. Now, evidence of an external kind to decide between determinism and indeterminism is, as I intimated a while back, strictly impossible to find. Let us look at the difference between them and see for ourselves.
Local word range 46861–47285passage classification

James distinguishes ordinary meanings of freedom from the deeper factual question of determinism versus indeterminism. He seriously examines whether human action is determined, but this excerpt does not settle the issue or directly judge its effect on autonomy.

Passage 2 · English

What is meant by saying that my choice of which way to walk home after the lecture is ambiguous and matter of chance as far as the present moment is concerned? It means that both Divinity Avenue and Oxford Street are called; but that only one, and that one either one, shall be chosen. Now, I ask you seriously to suppose that this ambiguity of my choice is real; and then to make the impossible hypothesis that the choice is made twice over, and each time falls on a different street. In other words, imagine that I first walk through Divinity Avenue, and then imagine that the powers governing the universe annihilate ten minutes of time with all that it contained, and set me back at the door of this hall just as I was before the choice was made. Imagine then that, everything else being the same, I now make a different choice and traverse Oxford Street.
“The Dilemma of Determinism,” pp. 155–57passage classification

James makes freedom intelligible as a genuinely open choice between alternatives rather than an imperfection in the order of nature.

Passage 3 · English

Although in its essence science only stands for a method and for no fixed belief, yet as habitually taken, both by its votaries and outsiders, it is identified with a certain fixed belief, — the belief that the hidden order of nature is mechanical exclusively, and that non-mechanical categories are irrational ways of conceiving and explaining even such things as human life. Now, this mechanical rationalism, as one may call it, makes, if it becomes one’s only way of thinking, a violent breach with the ways of thinking that have played the greatest part in human history. Religious thinking, ethical thinking, poetical thinking, teleological, emotional, sentimental thinking, what one might call the personal view of life to distinguish it from the impersonal and mechanical, and the romantic view of life to distinguish it from the rationalistic view, have been, and even still are, outside of well-drilled scientific circles, the dominant forms of thought. But for mechanical rationalism, personality is an insubstantial illusion.
“What Psychical Research Has Accomplished,” p. 323passage classification

James criticizes mechanical rationalism when it becomes a complete worldview, because it excludes personality and the forms of understanding organized around human significance.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1899Fiction · Romanian

In anul 4000 sau o calatorie la Venus

Victor Anestin

Free will and automatismMachines pose no inherent dangerEnlarges

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · Romanian

Fiecare e stăpîn pe persoana sa, fiecare face ceea ce voieşte. Legi nu există. Această omenire a înţeles adevărul scop al vieţii. Aruncaţi pe un glob din spaţiul nemărginit, la ce bun ar fi fost a se dezbina, a-.şi alege fiecare trib un stăpîn a cărui progenitură incapabilă sau capabilă să aibă drepturi asupra tuturor celorlalţi?
Chapter VII, description of Venusian social orderpassage classification

Anestin imagines a peaceful society as one without law or hereditary political mastery, where each person governs themselves.

Passage 2 · Romanian

Se ştie că erau numai 25 de indivizi cari formau un fel de guvern absolut şi fără nici un control din partea mulţimii. Dacă însă nu ar fi restrîns aşa de mult libertatea locuitorilor, închizînd pe unii din ei şi omorîn-du-le copiii, desigur că, cu toată autocraţia lor, aceştia nu s-ar fi revoltat. într-o noapte, locuitorii cei mai inteligenţi luînd iniţiativa, au distrus toate maşinele şi aparatele electrice cu care cei 25 dominau mulţimea; apoi, mulţimea a năvălit în palatele lor, distrugînd tot ce le ieşea în cale. Cel dinţii lucru la care s-a gîndit mulţimea a fost libertatea celor închişi.
Epilogue, overthrow of the rule of the Twenty-Fivepassage classification

The threat comes from an unaccountable scientific oligarchy that uses electrical machinery to dominate people; the narrative reports a revolt that destroys those instruments to recover liberty.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1899book · English

Talks to Teachers on Psychology

William James

Labour and mechanizationselection and judgmentEnlarges

1 selected passage · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

Psychology is a science, and teaching is an art; and sciences never generate arts directly out of themselves. An intermediary inventive mind must make the application, by using its originality. The science of logic never made a man reason rightly, and the science of ethics (if there be such a thing) never made a man behave rightly. The most such sciences can do is to help us to catch ourselves up and check ourselves, if we start to reason or to behave wrongly; and to criticise ourselves more articulately after we have made mistakes. A science only lays down lines within which the rules of the art must fall, laws which the follower of the art must not transgress; but what particular thing he shall positively do within those lines is left exclusively to his own genius.
“Psychology and the Teaching Art,” pp. 8–9passage classification

James distinguishes the general constraints supplied by science from the inventive, situated judgment required to act or teach well.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1902Science or medicine · English

Response in the Living and Non-Living

Jagadish Chandra Bose

Free will and automatismRejects: Life cannot be reduced to mechanismNo judgment

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

The parallel is the more striking since it has long been known with regard to animal tissues that the same drug, administered in large or small doses, might have opposite effects, and in preceding chapters we have seen that the same statement holds good of plants and metals also. #Stimulus of light.#--Even the responses of such a highly specialised organ as the retina are strictly paralleled by inorganic responses. We have seen how the stimulus of light evokes in the artificial retina responses which coincide in all their detail with those produced in the real retina. This was seen in ineffective stimuli becoming effective after repetition, in the relation between stimulus and response, and in the effects produced by temperature; also in the phenomenon of after-oscillation. These similarities went even further, the very abnormalities of retinal response finding their reflection in the inorganic.
Local word range 41891–42315passage classification

Bose argues from experimental parallels between animal, plant, metal, and artificial-retina responses. The passage rejects the need for a special vital force, but it does not directly evaluate human autonomy or agency.

Passage 2 · English

We have seen that amongst the phenomena of response, there is no necessity for the assumption of vital force. They are, on the contrary, physico-chemical phenomena, susceptible of a physical inquiry as definite as any other in inorganic regions. Physiologists have taught us to read in the response-curves a history of the influence of various external agencies and conditions on the phenomenon of life. By these means we are able to trace the gradual diminution of responsiveness by fatigue, by extremes of heat and cold, its exaltation by stimulants, the arrest of the life-process by poison. The investigations which have just been described may possibly carry us one step further, proving to us that these things are determined, not by the play of an unknowable and arbitrary vital force, but by the working of laws that know no change, acting equally and uniformly throughout the organic and the inorganic worlds.
Chapter XX, “General Survey and Conclusion”passage classification

Bose argues from comparative experimental response in metals, plants, and animals against a special vital force, extending invariant physical law across organic and inorganic matter.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1903book · English

The Souls of Black Folk

W. E. B. Du Bois

Cognition, attention, and judgmentselection and judgmentDiminishes

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world,—a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife,—this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would not Africanize America, for America has too much to teach the world and Africa. He would not bleach his Negro soul in a flood of white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a message for the world. He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being cursed and spit upon by his fellows, without having the doors of Opportunity closed roughly in his face.
Chapter I, “Of Our Spiritual Strivings,” pp. 2–4passage classification

Du Bois identifies a social order that forces self-interpretation through hostile external judgment, and makes undivided self-conscious agency dependent on equal standing.

Passage 2 · English

So dawned the time of _Sturm und Drang:_ storm and stress to-day rocks our little boat on the mad waters of the world-sea; there is within and without the sound of conflict, the burning of body and rending of soul; inspiration strives with doubt, and faith with vain questionings. The bright ideals of the past,—physical freedom, political power, the training of brains and the training of hands,—all these in turn have waxed and waned, until even the last grows dim and overcast. Are they all wrong,—all false? No, not that, but each alone was over-simple and incomplete,—the dreams of a credulous race-childhood, or the fond imaginings of the other world which does not know and does not want to know our power. To be really true, all these ideals must be melted and welded into one. The training of the schools we need to-day more than ever,—the training of deft hands, quick eyes and ears, and above all the broader, deeper, higher culture of gifted minds and pure hearts. The power of the ballot we need in sheer self-defence,—else what shall save us from a second slavery? Freedom, too, the long-sought, we still seek,—the freedom of life and limb, the freedom to work and think, the freedom to love and aspire. Work, culture, liberty,—all these we need, not singly but together, not successively but together, each growing and aiding each.
Chapter I, “Of Our Spiritual Strivings,” pp. 10–11passage classification

Du Bois rejects a single-variable account of freedom: political voice, material work, and the cultivation of human capacities must be developed together.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1905feminist utopian fiction · English

Sultana's Dream

Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain

Government, measurement, and surveillanceMachines remain toolsMixed

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

Our good Queen liked science very much. She circulated an order that all the women in her country should be educated. Accordingly a number of girls' schools were founded and supported by the government. Education was spread far and wide among women. And early marriage also was stopped. No woman was to be allowed to marry before she was twenty-one. I must tell you that, before this change we had been kept in strict purdah. While the women were engaged in scientific research, the men of this country were busy increasing their military power. When they came to know that the female universities were able to draw water from the atmosphere and collect heat from the sun, they only laughed at the members of the universities and called the whole thing "a sentimental nightmare"! Then the Lady Principal with her two thousand students marched to the battle field, and arriving there directed all the rays of the concentrated sunlight and heat towards the enemy. The heat and light were too much for them to bear. They all ran away panic-stricken, not knowing in their bewilderment how to counteract that scorching heat. When they fled away leaving their guns and other ammunitions of war, they were burnt down by means of the same sun-heat.
“Sultana’s Dream,” Ladyland’s scientific education and defeat of invasionpassage classification

Hossain’s inversion makes women’s public education and scientific institutions the condition of collective self-rule, while retaining the ambivalence of a technology used as a weapon.

Passage 2 · English

Our fields are tilled by means of electricity, which supplies motive power for other hard work as well, and we employ it for our aerial conveyances too. We have no rail road nor any paved streets here. Therefore neither street nor railway accidents occur here. [...] We are all very busy making nature yield as much as she can. We do not find time to quarrel with one another as we never sit idle. Our noble Queen is exceedingly fond of botany; it is her ambition to convert the whole country into one grand garden.
“Sultana’s Dream,” mechanized work and the transformed social orderpassage classification

Ladyland presents electrification as a release from hard manual work and a means of environmental management; its benefits are inseparable from the utopia’s deliberately organized social order.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1906speculative fiction · Russian

The Republic of the Southern Cross

Valery Bryusov

Labour and mechanizationHuman institutions create the dangerDiminishes

1 selected passage · each coded separately

Passage 1 · Russian

Главный город Республики, получивший название Звёздного, был расположен на самом полюсе. [...] Окон в стенах не было, так как здания освещались изнутри электричеством. Электричеством же освещались и улицы. Ввиду суровости климата над городом была устроена непроницаемая для света крыша, с могучими вентиляторами для постоянного обмена воздуха. [...] Подвесные электрические дороги соединяли между собой населённые места республики, перекидывая ежедневно из одного города в другой десятки тысяч людей и миллионы килограммов товара. Однако, эта демократическая внешность прикрывала чисто самодержавную тиранию членов-учредителей бывшего треста. Предоставляя другим места депутатов в Палате, они неизменно проводили своих кандидатов в директора заводов. В руках Совета этих директоров сосредоточивалась экономическая жизнь страны. Они принимали все заказы и распределяли их по заводам; они приобретали материалы и машины для работы; они вели всё хозяйство заводов.
“Республика Южного Креста,” opening report on Звёздный городpassage classification

Bryusov places technical abundance inside an ostensibly democratic but corporate state, locating domination in the institutional command of infrastructure, production, and public life.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1 selected passage · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

The pragmatic method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable. Is the world one or many? — fated or free? — material or spiritual? — here are notions either of which may or may not hold good of the world; and disputes over such notions are unending. The pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true? If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought to be able to show some practical difference that must follow from one side or the other’s being right. A glance at the history of the idea will show you still better what pragmatism means. The term is derived from the same Greek word [pi rho alpha gamma mu alpha], meaning action, from which our words ‘practice’ and ‘practical’ come. It was first introduced into philosophy by Mr. Charles Peirce in 1878. In an article entitled ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear,’ in the ‘Popular Science Monthly’ for January of that year [Footnote: Translated in the Revue Philosop hique for January, 1879 (vol. vii).] Mr. Peirce, after pointing out that our beliefs are really rules for action, said that to develope a thought’s meaning, we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce: that conduct is for us its sole significance. And the tangible fact at the root of all our thought-distinctions, however subtle, is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice. To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve — what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all.
What Pragmatism Means, pp. 44–46, lines 142–148passage classification

James treats the meaning of a thought as the difference it makes to expected experience and prepared action, rejecting purely verbal distinctions.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1908book · English

Memories of My Life

Francis Galton

Free will and automatismChoice accompanies mechanical causesDiminishes

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

Many years later I was so harassed with the old question of Determinism, which would leave every human action under the control of Heredity and Environment, that I made a series of observations on the actions of my own mind in relation to Free Will. I employ the word not merely as meaning ‘unhindered’ but in the special sense of an uncaused and creative action. It was carried on almost continuously for six weeks, and off and on for many subsequent months[55]. The procedure was this. Whenever I caught myself in an act of what seemed to be ‘Free Will’ in the above sense, I checked myself and tried hard to recollect what had happened before, made rapid notes, and then wrote a full account of the case. To my surprise, I found, after some days’ work, that the occasions were rare on which there seemed room for the exercise of Free Will as defined above. I subsequently reckoned that they did not occur oftener than once a day. Motives for all the other events could be traced backwards in succession, by orderly and continuous steps, until they led into a tangle of familiar paths. It was curious to watch the increase of power given by practice, of recalling mental actions which being usually overlooked give the false idea that much has been performed through a creative act, or by inspiration, which is really due to straightforward causation. The subject is too complex to be more fully gone into here; I must refer to the Memoir itself. The general result of the inquiry was to support the views of those who hold that man is little more than a conscious machine, the slave of heredity and environment, the larger part, perhaps all, of whose actions are therefore predictable. As regards such residuum as may not be automatic but creative, and which a Being, however wise and well-informed, could not possibly foresee, I have nothing to say, but I found that the more carefully I inquired, whether it was into hereditary similarities of conduct, into the life-histories of twins, or introspectively into the actions of my own mind, the smaller seemed the room left for this possible residuum.
Chapter XX, ‘Heredity,’ pp. 299–300, lines 1811–1814passage classification

Galton uses self-observation, twin evidence, and hereditary resemblance to argue that apparently creative acts are largely predictable effects of heredity and environment.

Passage 2 · English

The subject of Race Improvement, or Eugenics, with which I have much occupied myself during the last few years, is a pursuit of no recent interest. I published my views as long ago as 1865, in two articles written in Macmillan’s Magazine[20], while preparing materials for my book, Hereditary Genius. But I did not then realise, as now, the powerful influence of Small Causes upon statistical results. I was too much disposed to think of marriage under some regulation, and not enough of the effects of self-interest and of social and religious sentiment. Popular feeling was not then ripe to accept even the elementary truths of hereditary talent and character, upon which the possibility of Race Improvement depends. Still less was it prepared to consider dispassionately any proposals for practical action. So I laid the subject wholly to one side for many years. Now I see my way better, and an appreciative audience is at last to be had, though it be small. As in most other cases of novel views, the wrong-headedness of objectors to Eugenics has been curious. The most common misrepresentations now are that its methods must be altogether those of compulsory unions, as in breeding animals. It is not so. I think that stern compulsion ought to be exerted to prevent the free propagation of the stock of those who are seriously afflicted by lunacy, feeble-mindedness, habitual criminality, and pauperism, but that is quite different from compulsory marriage. How to restrain ill-omened marriages is a question by itself, whether it should be effected by seclusion, or in other ways yet to be devised that are consistent with a humane and well-informed public opinion. I cannot doubt that our democracy will ultimately refuse consent to that liberty of propagating children which is now allowed to the undesirable classes, but the populace has yet to be taught the true state of these things. A democracy cannot endure unless it be composed of able citizens; therefore it must in self-defence withstand the free introduction of degenerate stock. What I desire is that the importance of eugenic marriages should be reckoned at its just value, neither too high nor too low, and that Eugenics should form one of the many considerations by which marriages are promoted or hindered, as they are by social position, adequate fortune, and similarity of creed. I can believe hereafter that it will be felt as derogatory to a person of exceptionally good stock to marry into an inferior one as it is for a person of high Austrian rank to marry one who has not sixteen heraldic quarterings. I also hope that social recognition of an appropriate kind will be given to healthy, capable, and large families, and that social influence will be exerted towards the encouragement of eugenic marriages.
Chapter XXI, ‘Race Improvement,’ pp. 314–315, lines 1887–1896passage classification

Galton explicitly advocates state and social restrictions on reproduction to reshape population quality, subordinating reproductive liberty to eugenic governance.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1908Fiction · English

The War in the Air

H. G. Wells

Technological catastropheHuman institutions create the dangerDiminishes

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

The essential fact of the politics of the age in which Bert Smallways lived--the age that blundered at last into the catastrophe of the War in the Air--was a very simple one, if only people had had the intelligence to be simple about it. The development of Science had altered the scale of human affairs. By means of rapid mechanical traction, it had brought men nearer together, so much nearer socially, economically, physically, that the old separations into nations and kingdoms were no longer possible, a newer, wider synthesis was not only needed, but imperatively demanded. Just as the once independent dukedoms of France had to fuse into a nation, so now the nations had to adapt themselves to a wider coalescence, they had to keep what was precious and possible, and concede what was obsolete and dangerous. A saner world would have perceived this patent need for a reasonable synthesis, would have discussed it temperately, achieved and gone on to organise the great civilisation that was manifestly possible to mankind. The world of Bert Smallways did nothing of the sort. Its national governments, its national interests, would not hear of anything so obvious; they were too suspicious of each other, too wanting in generous imaginations. They began to behave like ill-bred people in a crowded public car, to squeeze against one another, elbow, thrust, dispute and quarrel. Vain to point out to them that they had only to rearrange themselves to be comfortable. Everywhere, all over the world, the historian of the early twentieth century finds the same thing, the flow and rearrangement of human affairs inextricably entangled by the old areas, the old prejudices and a sort of heated irascible stupidity, and everywhere congested nations in inconvenient areas, slopping population and produce into each other, annoying each other with tariffs, and every possible commercial vexation, and threatening each other with navies and armies that grew every year more portentous.
Chapter III, ‘The German Air-Fleet,’ lines 2696–2714passage classification

Wells locates the disaster not in mechanical progress alone but in national institutions failing to reorganize themselves for the interdependence that technology has created.

Passage 2 · English

The special peculiarities of aerial warfare were of such a nature as to trend, once it had begun, almost inevitably towards social disorganisation. The first of these peculiarities was brought home to the Germans in their attack upon New York; the immense power of destruction an airship has over the thing below, and its relative inability to occupy or police or guard or garrison a surrendered position. Necessarily, in the face of urban populations in a state of economic disorganisation and infuriated and starving, this led to violent and destructive collisions, and even where the air-fleet floated inactive above, there would be civil conflict and passionate disorder below. Nothing comparable to this state of affairs had been known in the previous history of warfare, unless we take such a case as that of a nineteenth century warship attacking some large savage or barbaric settlement, or one of those naval bombardments that disfigure the history of Great Britain in the late eighteenth century. Then, indeed, there had been cruelties and destruction that faintly foreshadowed the horrors of the aerial war. Moreover, before the twentieth century the world had had but one experience, and that a comparatively light one, in the Communist insurrection of Paris, 1871, of the possibilities of a modern urban population under warlike stresses. A second peculiarity of airship war as it first came to the world that also made for social collapse, was the ineffectiveness of the early air-ships against each other. Upon anything below they could rain explosives in the most deadly fashion, forts and ships and cities lay at their mercy, but unless they were prepared for a suicidal grapple they could do remarkably little mischief to each other.
Chapter X, ‘The World under the War,’ lines 6638–6670passage classification

Wells identifies a structural asymmetry of aerial power: it can devastate a society without supplying the capacity to govern the disorder it produces.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1908Fiction · Chinese

Xin Shitou Ji (New Story of the Stone)

Wu Jianren

Dependence, succession, and replacementDependence weakens human capacitiesDiminishes

1 selected passage · each coded separately

Passage 1 · Chinese

寶玉道:「既是中國的船,為甚要用外國人駛?」包妥當道:「中國人不會駛呢。」寶玉搖頭道:「沒有的話!外國人也不多兩個眼睛,也不多兩條膀子,有什麼不會的?不斈罷了。」包妥當道:「只怕心眼兒不及他呢。」寶玉道:「但凡是個人,心眼兒總是一樣的。不過有一種人被一種嗜好迷住,不得開罷了。還有孔子說的:『人一能之,己百之;人十能之,己千之。』那裡有斈不會的斈問呢?咱們不趕早斈會了,萬一他們各咱們不對起來,撒手不乾了,那就怎麼好呢?這麼大的船,不成了廢物了麼?」
第02回,寶玉與包妥當論輪船技術passage classification

Wu casts technical dependence on foreign operators as a preventable loss of collective capacity, answered by learning and self-reliance.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1910speculative serial fiction · Spanish

El hombre artificial

Horacio Quiroga, under the name S. Fragoso Lima

Machine minds and made personsMade beings may deserve moral standingNo judgment

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · Spanish

—Tardaríamos mil años. Fíjese en el proceso de afinación de nuestro cerebro; tiene millones de años, toda la edad de la humanidad. Nuestro hombre se encontraría, en cuanto a la inteligencia —o percepción, como se la llame—, en el mismo estado que un recién nacido. —Todo esto es perfectamente cierto; y mientras usted hablaba, iba yo haciendo iguales consideraciones. Pero, por lógico que sea su razonamiento, no es más que una conjetura. Creo que ésta es justamente la falla de su razonamiento: estamos juzgando como seres creados y no como creadores. ¿Quién puede decir qué facultades tendrá un sistema nervioso hecho en todos sus elementos con idéntica constitución a la de un hombre en plena edad viril?
§9, the scientists debate the intellect of an artificial adult bodypassage classification

The dialogue treats mindedness in an artificial human as an open empirical and conceptual question, not a property guaranteed by a mature body’s form.

Passage 2 · Spanish

—Sí… Nos es indispensable una intensa producción de dolor, una sobreaguda corriente de dolor, para provocar en su sistema nervioso una sensibilidad que sólo los años darían. Acuérdense de la discusión que tuvimos al principio, comparando nuestra obra a un acumulador… Ha sido fabricado como un acumulador; pero ahora será una bobina, un carrete… la corriente obrará por influencia.
§10, Donissoff’s experiment to create a history of sensationpassage classification

The story makes experience—here disastrously imposed pain—central to the attempt to create a mind, foregrounding the maker’s responsibility to the created being and to the exploited human victim.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1911speculative fiction · Polish

Stara Ziemia (The Old Earth)

Jerzy Zulawski

Labour and mechanizationMachines remain toolsDiminishes

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · Polish

Te miliony maszyn, ludziom służące, wymaga ą z swe strony do obsługi całe rzeszy robotników czu nych, umie ętnych, metalowe , nielitościwe dziwostworze po prostu za- +przedanych i niemyślących o niczym więce , ak że w dane chwili trzeba pewien guzik +pocisnąć lub dźwignię przerzucić. Pracu ą względnie krótko, płatni są dobrze, ale umysł +ich, zaostrza ąc się w ednym kierunku, tępie e dziwnie we wszystkich innych, robiąc ich +z wolna obo ętnymi na to, co się dzie e poza fabryką, warsztatem i kołem ich na bliższe +rodziny.
Część pierwsza, I, pp. 10–11passage classification

The narrated future treats well-paid technical service as a form of cognitive narrowing and social indifference, not simply economic deprivation.

Passage 2 · Polish

A iluż to ludzi „nieproduktywnych” dlatego tylko głodu nie znało, że pracować mu- +sieli obowiązkowo i eśli się nie umieli rządzić tym, co im dawano za pracę niechętną, +bywali zabierani pod państwową opiekę… A byli wśród nich ludzie młodzi nieraz, póź- +nie si wynalazcy i odkrywcy, pisarze i artyści do ręczne pracy zmuszeni, marnie ący +często, sławni nieraz dopiero po śmierci, a za życia w cień przez szczęśliwych i modnych +„kolegów”, schlebiaczy gawiedzi, zepchnięci…
Część pierwsza, I, p. 10passage classification

The fictional welfare state secures subsistence while compulsory labour and paternal administration waste inventive and artistic capacities.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1911Politics or economics · English

The Principles of Scientific Management

Frederick Winslow Taylor

Labour and mechanizationHuman institutions create the dangerDiminishes

3 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

Thus all of the planning which under the old system was done by the workman, as a result of his personal experience, must of necessity under the new system be done by the management in accordance with the laws of the science; because even if the workman was well suited to the development and use of scientific data, it would be physically impossible for him to work at his machine and at a desk at the same time. It is also clear that in most cases one type of man is needed to plan ahead and an entirely different type to execute the work. The man in the planning room, whose specialty under scientific management is planning ahead, invariably finds that the work can be done better and more economically by a subdivision of the labor; each act of each mechanic, for example, should be preceded by various preparatory acts done by other men. And all of this involves, as we have said, "an almost equal division of the responsibility and the work between the management and the workman."
Local word range 8166–8590passage classification

Taylor argues that scientific management transfers planning from workers to management and divides labour between those who plan and those who execute. This makes workplace action more economically organized but diminishes workers' independent control and practical responsibility.

Passage 2 · English

In the past the man has been first; in the future the system must be first. This in no sense, however, implies that great men are not needed. On the contrary, the first object of any good system must be that of developing first-class men; and under systematic management the best man rises to the top more certainly and more rapidly than ever before.
Introduction, on system and the development of workerspassage classification

Taylor explicitly shifts priority from personal discretion to designed systems, while presenting that shift as a means of developing, rather than replacing, capable workers.

Passage 3 · English

The words "maximum prosperity" are used, in their broad sense, to mean not only large dividends for the company or owner, but the development of every branch of the business to its highest state of excellence, so that the prosperity may be permanent. In the same way maximum prosperity for each employee means not only higher wages than are usually received by men of his class, but, of more importance still, it also means the development of each man to his state of maximum efficiency, so that he may be able to do, generally speaking, the highest grade of work for which his natural abilities fit him, and it further means giving him, when possible, this class of work to do.
Chapter I, “Fundamentals of Scientific Management”passage classification

Taylor’s strongest affirmative account treats the worker’s development and matching to a task as compatible with maximum output and employer prosperity.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1913speculative fiction · Spanish

Mecanopolis

Miguel de Unamuno

Dependence, succession, and replacementMachines may succeed humanityDiminishes

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · Spanish

Renuncio a describirte la ciudad. No podemos ni soñar todo lo que de magnificencia, de suntuosidad, de comodidad y de higiene estaba allí acumulado. Por cierto que no me daba cuenta para qué todo aquel aparato de higiene, pues no se veía ser vivo alguno. Ni hombres, ni animales. Ni un perro cruzaba la calle; ni una golondrina, el cielo.
“Mecanópolis,” middle sectionpassage classification

The traveller finds perfected technical provision after living beings have vanished, making replacement rather than mere assistance the story’s central horror.

Passage 2 · Spanish

Pero de pronto me asaltó una idea terrible, y era la de que las máquinas aquellas tuviesen su alma, un alma mecánica, y que eran las máquinas mismas las que me compadecían. Esta idea me hizo temblar. Creí encontrarme ante la raza que ha de dominar la tierra deshumanizada.
“Mecanópolis,” conclusionpassage classification

The first-person narrator fears a machine soul and a successor race, but the nested tale presents this as a terror to be considered rather than established fact.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1913Philosophy · English

Mechanism, Life and Personality

J. S. Haldane

Tools and agentsRejects: Machines remain toolsNo judgment

3 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

In the light of this more adequate hypothesis the parts and activities which we discern in a living organism and its biological environment can be understood only as manifestations of a whole which is the life of the organism, and which expresses itself in activity. The parts and their spatial arrangements, including environment, are the expression of active and unceasing maintenance, nutrition, or metabolism; and the activities are activities which express themselves in this maintenance. Reproduction is only a phase of that constant insensible reproduction which is ordinarily called nutrition. The structures or spatial arrangements and activities maintain themselves as a whole, and together constitute the whole which we call life. They cannot be understood as the separate parts and activities of a machine can be understood; and the spatial arrangements of the parts, including environment, cannot be understood as those of a mechanical system. Life does not exist as something localised in space. Spatial relations are within it, as an expression of it. An organism considered simply as such is blind to its experience. Its reactions are simply the expression of its nature. ... The characteristic distinction of a conscious organism is that it ‘learns’ from experience. This signifies that a conscious nervous response is determined not merely by the simultaneously inflowing influences from all parts of the living body and its environment, but also by what, in order of time, has preceded or will succeed.
Summary of Book, pp. 140–45 (1921 printing of the 1913 lectures)passage classification

Haldane rejects both the reduction of life to separable mechanisms and the hypothesis of an independently acting vital force. Life is an active, self-maintaining organism–environment whole; conscious personality adds learning from experience, with past and future in view.

Passage 2 · English

The living body and its physiological environment form an organic whole, the parts of which cannot be understood in separation from one another. Our ordinary language as applied to life corresponds with these characteristics. We naturally speak of a living organism as an autonomous active whole, and think of it as such. The idea of its being a mechanism made up of separable parts, and actuated by external causes, is wholly unnatural to us, and becomes more and more unnatural
Lecture III, “Biology and Physical Sciences,” p. 80passage classification

Haldane’s anti-mechanism begins from organismic wholeness: the living body and its environment cannot be understood as separable causal components.

Passage 3 · English

The characteristic distinction of a conscious organism is that it ‘learns’ from experience. This signifies that a conscious nervous response is determined not merely by the simultaneously inflowing influences from all parts of the living body and its environment, but also by what, in order of time, has preceded or will succeed. From the physical, or even the biological, point of view such a fact appears as a completely unexpected and unintelligible ‘revelation.’ Yet it is a fact which must be insisted on as fundamental in the interpretation of our experience of personality. We are unable to reconcile it with the physical or biological interpretations; but it is there as a fact of experience, and if it is inconsistent with the physical and biological interpretations we can only conclude that they are both of them only provisional and imperfect interpretations.
Lecture IV, “Personality,” pp. 119–20passage classification

For Haldane, learning and temporally extended conscious response reveal personality as irreducible to physical or biological explanation.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1913Philosophy · German

Zur Mechanik des Geistes

Walther Rathenau

Labour and mechanizationConsiders: Machines remain toolsMixed

3 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · German

Die Maschine erwuchs, ihr Arbeitsgenosse wurde zum Pfleger und Aufseher, und die Mechanisierungspraxis selbst, freilich nicht aus Menschlichkeit, sondern aus ökonomischem Instinkt, betrachtet heute den Betrieb als unvollkommen, der geistlose Arbeit fordert. Den Ausfall an Muskelleistung muß die zweite Natur der freiwilligen Körperübung bekämpfen; Jugendausbildung und reichliche Mußezeit sind bestimmt, dem Geiste Spannkraft und Verantwortungsfähigkeit zu erwerben und zu erhalten. In dieser Richtung sehen wir die Wirtschaftstendenzen in mechanistisch vorgeschrittenen Ländern sich bewegen; eine Rückkehr zum patriarchalischen und sklavischen Verhältnis findet nirgends statt; eine spätere Periode aber wird die Forderung wachsender Vergeistigung und Verantwortung der Arbeit zum sittlichen Prinzip erheben und lieber auf Arbeitsgüter verzichten, als sie aus den Händen menschlicher Maschinen empfangen.

Working English translation

The machine emerged and became its fellow worker, caretaker, and overseer; and mechanization itself, prompted not by humanity but by economic instinct, now regards as imperfect an enterprise that demands mindless labour. The loss of muscular exertion must be countered by the second nature of voluntary physical exercise; education for the young and abundant leisure are intended to acquire and preserve strength of mind and capacity for responsibility. In this direction we see economic tendencies moving in technologically advanced countries; nowhere is there a return to patriarchal and slave-like relations; but a later period will elevate the demand for the increasing spiritualization and responsibility of work into a moral principle, and would rather forgo products of labour than receive them from the hands of human machines.
Local word range 71356–71780passage classificationsource wording still to be checked

Rathenau presents mechanization as transforming the machine into a worker, caretaker, and overseer while reducing the need for bodily labour. He argues that exercise, education, leisure, and increasingly responsible work can preserve human strength of mind and responsibility. The passage favors refusing goods produced by dehumanized ‘human machines,’ but treats mechanization’s effects as potentially redeemable through human development rather than simply rejecting all machinery.

Passage 2 · German

Denn da der Mensch sein Gleichgewicht aus der Gegenwart in die Zukunft, aus seinem Inneren in die Welt gerückt hat, so bedarf er in höchstem Maße der Welt, der Menschen und der Dinge; der Welt, um zu scheinen; der Menschen, um zu herrschen und zu gelten; der Dinge, um zu besitzen. Indem er nun scheinen und herrschen will, wird er in Wahrheit abhängig; er ist angewiesen auf Meinung und Zustimmung, und da es seiner Natur nicht entspricht, sie zu erzwingen, so muß er sie erschleichen und erlisten. Weil er der Dinge bedarf, wird sein Handeln abermals unfrei, denn er sieht sich an Verhältnisse, willkürliche Gesetze und unfreiwillige Arbeit gekettet.
Erstes Buch, p. 31passage classification

Rathenau locates unfreedom in acquisitive, status-seeking dependence on institutions and things, rather than in autonomous machines.

Passage 3 · German

Enttäuscht steigt der Erdenbürger in die Vielfältigkeit des Lebens hinab; und wirklich, die Fülle der Erscheinungen überwältigt ihn nicht. Heroen werden zu Menschen, Paradiese zu Mechanismen, und erstaunlich bleibt nur die Menge des Gewußten, der enthüllten Gesetze, der gelösten Rätsel. Von den Erfahrungen der Jahrtausende nimmt er sein Erbe in Anspruch und denkt es zu mehren, und je unermeßlicher der Reichtum in seinen Händen, desto ärmer die Welt.
Erstes Buch, p. 34passage classification

The critique is epistemic and spiritual: accumulated knowledge and solved problems can convert lived ideals into inert mechanisms without yielding a richer world.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1914Fiction · English

The World Set Free

H. G. Wells

Labour and mechanizationHuman institutions create the dangerMixed

3 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

In a little while the mere absence of occupation for so great a multitude of people everywhere became an evident social danger, and the government was obliged to resort to such devices as simple decorative work in wood and stone, the manufacture of hand-woven textiles, fruit-growing, flower-growing, and landscape gardening on a grand scale to keep the less adaptable out of mischief, and of paying wages to the younger adults for attendance at schools that would equip them to use the new atomic machinery.... So quite insensibly the council drifted into a complete reorganisation of urban and industrial life, and indeed of the entire social system. Ideas that are unhampered by political intrigue or financial considerations have a sweeping way with them, and before a year was out the records of the council show clearly that it was rising to its enormous opportunity, and partly through its own direct control and partly through a series of specific committees, it was planning a new common social order for the entire population of the earth.
Local word range 48636–49060passage classification

The passage presents technological unemployment as a social danger and describes a government-led reorganization of work, education, and urban life. It treats centralized planning as a response to unequal economic conditions, while leaving the effects on human autonomy mixed: people gain education and material security, but their occupations and social arrangements become increasingly directed by institutions.

Passage 2 · English

It would mean a change in human conditions that I can only compare to the discovery of fire, that first discovery that lifted man above the brute. We stand to-day towards radio-activity as our ancestor stood towards fire before he had learnt to make it. He knew it then only as a strange thing utterly beyond his control, a flare on the crest of the volcano, a red destruction that poured through the forest. So it is that we know radio-activity to-day. This—this is the dawn of a new day in human living.
Book I, chapter on Holsten’s lecture on atomic energypassage classification

Wells frames a new energy technology as a civilizational threshold whose promise is inseparable from its present lack of human control.

Passage 3 · English

The stuff exercised an irresistible fascination upon a certain type of mind. Why should any one give in while he can still destroy his enemies? Surrender? While there is still a chance of blowing them to dust? The power of destruction which had once been the ultimate privilege of government was now the only power left in the world—and it was everywhere.
Book II, “The Last War,” section on the global proliferation of atomic bombspassage classification

The catastrophe is political rather than merely technical: widely distributed destructive capacity makes restraint irrational for actors still pursuing victory.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1916satirical speculative fiction · Hungarian

Utazas Faremidoba

Frigyes Karinthy

Dependence, succession, and replacementMachines may succeed humanityDiminishes

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · Hungarian

Végre addig jutottunk, hogy a gépek nemcsak hogy megsegítették az embert minden dolgában s megsokszorozták erejét, de egymagukban sokkal tökéletesebben végezték el a munkát, mint ahogy gyarló emberi testünk valaha elvégezhette. Így a művészetek is: képek, szobrok, írásművek, zeneművek, az élet tüneteit, a formát, színt, történetet, érzelmet oly tökéllyel fejezték ki, hogy a való élet messze mögöttük maradt leleményben, szépségben, kifejező erőben. Mi következett ebből? Gépek és művek felülmúlták az embert: tökéletesebbé lettek, s csakhamar ott tartottunk, hogy ha az ember tökéletes akart lenni, utánozni volt kénytelen a gépeket és a műveket, amik egykor az embert utánozták.
Chapter VI, narrator’s account of machine developmentpassage classification

Karinthy imagines a reversal in which tools and cultural artifacts surpass their makers and become the models humans must imitate.

Passage 2 · Hungarian

Ezt az állatot választja ki az élet, hogy belőle tökéletest alkosson. Az ösztön szervét kell fejleszteni, hogy ami eddig öntudatlan és mechanikus volt, tudatossá váljék s önmagát megismerővé. Néhány ezer év s a munka sikerül, a koponya üregében lassan fejlődni kezd az új szerv: a Tudat szerve, mely a külső és belső jelenségeket megérti, s azokhoz nem álomszerű tudatlanságban alkalmazkodik, de a belátás és akarat világító fáklyája mellett. S íme, előttünk áll az Ember, a Tudatos Élet, átérezve a lét minden örömét és igájába hajtva a nyers és ostoba anyagban rejlő erőket, hogy az egyén életét minél szebbé és boldogabbá tegye és ujjonghasson a kék és távoli ég s a felkelő nap felé!
Chapter VI, narrator’s account of consciousness and human masterypassage classification

The human narrator defines consciousness as understanding and will overcoming unconscious mechanism, a position the later Faremido encounter will ironize.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1918Fiction · Russian

Poeziia rabochego udara

Alexei Gastev

Labour and mechanizationMachines remain toolsDiminishes

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · Russian

Только вошел, и уже полонен, покорен, закован весь без остатка стихіей грома, движенія, свѣта. Воздух гремит и восторженно стонет. - Желѣзная душа завода пронзила толпу. Грудь загудѣла металли- ческой дрожью. В корпусах началась грузная возня. И все тяжелѣе, все громче. Корпуса разорвутся, лопнут. Они сейчас снимутся съ мѣста, взорвутся. Разразится катастрофа, из земли вырвутся фонтаны раскаленнаго металла... — Ну, да грянь! Грянь!—Мы готовы! Мы надворѣ, мы уже другіе. Толпа идет новым маршем, ноги уловили желѣзный темп. Руки горят, им нельзя без дѣла, им не терпится без молотка, без работы. Токи энергіи надо раз- рядить. — Бей же! Бей! Да скорѣе, да чаще! Руби, пили! К машинам! Мы—их рычаг, мы—их дыханіе, замысел. Т ы с я ч а работников, необъятная площадь станков. — Пѣсню! Желѣзную! Одну, единую! Еще, еще быстрѣе мчитесь колеса! Камень, металл, работники, все в вихрѣ, смѣшалось.

Working English translation

The moment one enters, one is already captured, subdued, shackled completely by the element of thunder, movement, and light. The air thunders and groans ecstatically. The iron soul of the factory pierces the crowd. The breast hums with a metallic tremor. In the buildings a heavy bustle begins. And everything grows heavier, louder. The buildings will burst, split apart. They are about to tear themselves from their foundations, explode. A catastrophe will break out; fountains of molten metal will burst from the earth. Well then, let it thunder! We are ready! We are outside; we are already different. The crowd proceeds in a new march; its feet have caught the iron tempo. Their hands burn; they cannot remain idle and cannot wait without a hammer, without work. Currents of energy must be discharged. Strike! Strike! Faster, more often! Cut, saw! To the machines! We are their lever, their breath, their design. A thousand workers, an immeasurable expanse of machines. A song! An iron one! One, unified! Faster still, wheels, rush on! Stone, metal, workers—all are mixed together in the whirlwind.
Local word range 12781–13205passage classification

The passage celebrates and dramatizes the factory's power, but depicts workers as captured, shackled, and absorbed into its mechanical rhythm: they become the machines' lever, breath, and design. The predicted explosion introduces a clear image of technological catastrophe. Its ecstatic tone makes restriction an implicit consideration rather than an explicit policy recommendation.

Passage 2 · Russian

Смотрите!—Я стою среди них: станков, моло­тов, вагранок и горн и среди сотни товарищей. Гляжу на них и выпрямляюсь. В жилы льется новая желђзная кровь. Я вырос еще. У меня у самого вырастают стальныя плечи и безмёрно сильныя руки. Я слился с желђзом постройки.
«Введеніе: Мы растем из желђза», p. 7passage classification

Gastev's lyric makes industrial work a collective transformation: the speaker represents the factory's iron as a new strength incorporated into the worker's body.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1920book · English

Collected Essays and Reviews

William James

Free will and automatismReports: selection and judgmentMixed

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

For him it is merely a question as to the ambiguity of certain futures, those human acts, namely, which are preceded by deliberation. What are the phenomena here? A representation arises in a mind, but ere it can discharge itself into a train of action, it is inhibited by another which confronts it. This, on the point of discharging itself, is again checked by the first, which returns with a reinforced intensity, and so for a time the pendulum swings to and fro, till finally one or the other representation recurs with such a degree of reinforcement that the tumult ceases, and an act, a decision for the future, or the arrest of a passionate impulse takes place. This stable survival of one representation is called a volition.
“Bain and Renouvier,” p. 28passage classification

In his account of Renouvier, James describes deliberation as a contest among representations whose settled survival constitutes volition.

Passage 2 · English

The point of application of the volitional effort always lies within the inner world, being an idea or representation of afferent sensations of some sort. From its intrinsic nature or from the presence of other ideas, this representation may spontaneously tend to lapse from vivid and stable consciousness. Mental effort may then accompany its maintenance. Attention, belief, affirmation, and motor volition are thus four names for an identical process, incidental to the conflict of ideas alone, the survival of one in spite of the opposition of others.
“The Feeling of Effect,” pp. 217–18passage classification

James treats attention, belief, and motor volition as one selective process: mental effort is the maintenance of an idea against competing ideas.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1920book · English

Darkwater: Voices from Within the Veil

W. E. B. Du Bois

Labour and mechanizationHuman institutions create the dangerDiminishes

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

The scheme of Europe was no sudden invention, but a way out of long-pressing difficulties. It is plain to modern white civilization that the subjection of the white working classes cannot much longer be maintained. Education, political power, and increased knowledge of the technique and meaning of the industrial process are destined to make a more and more equitable distribution of wealth in the near future. The day of the very rich is drawing to a close, so far as individual white nations are concerned. But there is a loophole. There is a chance for exploitation on an immense scale for inordinate profit, not simply to the very rich, but to the middle class and to the laborers. This chance lies in the exploitation of darker peoples. It is here that the golden hand beckons. Here are no labor unions or votes or questioning onlookers or inconvenient consciences. These men may be used down to the very bone, and shot and maimed in "punitive" expeditions when they revolt. In these dark lands "industrial development" may repeat in exaggerated form every horror of the industrial history of Europe, from slavery and rape to disease and maiming, with only one test of success,--dividends!
“The Souls of White Folk,” p. 43passage classification

Du Bois argues that industrial prosperity and class accommodation in Europe are purchased through colonial exploitation, where political rights and public scrutiny are withheld.

Passage 2 · English

This theory of human culture and its aims has worked itself through warp and woof of our daily thought with a thoroughness that few realize. Everything great, good, efficient, fair, and honorable is "white"; everything mean, bad, blundering, cheating, and dishonorable is "yellow"; a bad taste is "brown"; and the devil is "black." The changes of this theme are continually rung in picture and story, in newspaper heading and moving-picture, in sermon and school book, until, of course, the King can do no wrong,--a White Man is always right and a Black Man has no rights which a white man is bound to respect.
“The Souls of White Folk,” pp. 43–44passage classification

Du Bois identifies the ordinary media, religious, and educational reproduction of racial hierarchy as an infrastructure that makes unequal rights appear legitimate.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1922Fiction · Portuguese

O Reino de Kiato

Rodolfo Teofilo

Crowds, media, and public opinionReports: Human institutions create the dangerMixed

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · Portuguese

O baptismo do remedio seria a reclame, mas como preceitua o ritual americano: intelligente, berrante, a accordar o publico absorvido na intensa luta pela vida. Paterson, não se achando habilitado para tão difficil tarefa, dirigiu-se a um especialista e contractou por alguns mil dollares o plano da propaganda. Não seria o annuncio esteril de quarta pagina de jornal, mas annuncio que impressionasse por um ou mais sentidos. New-York despertou um dia atordoada com a reclame do nevrozicida. Lia-se o annuncio por toda a parte. Cartazes, affixados nos lugares mais frequentados pelo publico, representavam, em bellissimos chromos, diversos doentes que com o milagroso remedio haviam alcançado a cura. Bandos de palhaços, vestidos de corres berrantes, percorriam as ruas, a fazer piruetas, distribuindo reclames.
Chapter III, publicity campaign for the nevrozicidapassage classification

Teófilo stages commercial propaganda as an engineered sensory environment: specialists purchase attention and make an unverified cure seem socially omnipresent.

Passage 2 · Portuguese

A todos que aportarem ao reino de Kiato faço saber que: — sendo prohibida a fabricação do álcool e de líquidos que o contenham, como o maior factor que é da degeneração physica, e perversão moral do genero humano, é condemnado á morte todo aquelle que infringir essa lei humana e sabia; os que desembarcarem em estado de embriaguez, offendendo a sã moral dos habitantes do Reino, dando um exemplo péssimo de sua corrupção, serão presos e enviados ao navio de que são passageiros e este intimado a deixar o porto dentro de duas horas; prohibido o plantio e, ipso-facto, a manipulação e o uso de fumo, causa que é de graves desordens orgânicas que encurtam a vida, serão presos e deportados os que clandestinamente procurarem restaurar o uso e o plantio do fumo em Kiato; é prohibido o desembarque em todos os portos do Reino aos doentes de moléstias contagiosas.
Chapter V, manifesto of the Kingdom of Kiatopassage classification

The fictional polity makes health and moral claims the warrant for coercive regulation, including execution, deportation, and exclusion from its ports.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1922Politics or economics · English

Public Opinion

Walter Lippmann

Government, measurement, and surveillanceHuman institutions create the dangerMixed

3 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

The democratic fallacy has been its preoccupation with the origin of government rather than with the processes and results. The democrat has always assumed that if political power could be derived in the right way, it would be beneficent. His whole attention has been on the source of power, since he is hypnotized by the belief that the great thing is to express the will of the people, first because expression is the highest interest of man, and second because the will is instinctively good. But no amount of regulation at the source of a river will completely control its behavior, and while democrats have been absorbed in trying to find a good mechanism for originating social power, that is to say a good mechanism of voting and representation, they neglected almost every other interest of men. For no matter how power originates, the crucial interest is in how power is exercised. What determines the quality of civilization is the use made of power. And that use cannot be controlled at the source.
Local word range 78101–78525passage classification

Lippmann argues that democracy cannot secure good government merely by arranging the proper origin of political power or expressing popular will. Human autonomy and dignity depend instead on how power is exercised and on the practical results of government, so political power must be evaluated and governed beyond the act of voting.

Passage 2 · English

In all these instances we must note particularly one common factor. It is the insertion between man and his environment of a pseudo-environment. To that pseudo-environment his behavior is a response. But because it is behavior, the consequences, if they are acts, operate not in the pseudo-environment where the behavior is stimulated, but in the real environment where action eventuates. If the behavior is not a practical act, but what we call roughly thought and emotion, it may be a long time before there is any noticeable break in the texture of the fictitious world. But when the stimulus of the pseudo-fact results in action on things or other people, contradiction soon develops.
Chapter I, "The World Outside and the Pictures in Our Heads"passage classification

Lippmann argues that action is guided through socially made representations of an environment, whose practical consequences nonetheless unfold in the real world.

Passage 3 · English

Without some form of censorship, propaganda in the strict sense of the word is impossible. In order to conduct a propaganda there must be some barrier between the public and the event. Access to the real environment must be limited, before anyone can create a pseudo-environment that he thinks wise or desirable. For while people who have direct access can misconceive what they see, no one else can decide how they shall misconceive it, unless he can decide where they shall look, and at what.
Chapter III, "The Contact Between the World Outside and the Pictures in Our Heads"passage classification

Propaganda works here by arranging access and attention: an institution that controls what people can see can steer the public's interpretation of events.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1923Fiction · English

R.U.R. (Rossum's Universal Robots): A Fantastic Melodrama in Three Acts and an Epilogue

Čapek, Karel

Tools and agentsMachines remain toolsMixed

1 selected passage · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English translation

But a working machine must not play the piano, must not feel happy, must not do a whole lot of other things. A gasoline motor must not have tassels or ornaments, Miss Glory. And to manufacture artificial workers is the same thing as the manufacture of a gasoline motor. The process must be the simplest, and the product the best from a practical point of view. The one that is the cheapest. The one whose requirements are the smallest. Young Rossum invented a worker with the minimum amount of requirements. He had to simplify him. He rejected everything that did not contribute directly to the progress of work. Everything that makes man more expensive. In fact he rejected man and made the Robot. My dear Miss Glory, the Robots are not people. Mechanically they are more perfect than we are; they have an enormously developed intelligence, but they have no soul.
Act I, Domin explains the design of the Robotpassage classification

Domin defines artificial workers through economic simplification, separating technical intelligence from personhood and making person-like capacities a production cost.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1923worker poetry · Japanese

Sagyo Kikai (Work Machine)

Wakizo Hosoi

Labour and mechanizationMachines remain toolsDiminishes

1 selected passage · each coded separately

Passage 1 · Japanese

こいつを人間が使ってだ 人々がその慾望を楽々と慰められると思ったが 奴等 金持がにっこりと微笑したに止って 機械の運転者――職工――は機構の一部となってしまった 機械的労働 十二時間 十八時間 徹夜! 寝ぼけてしまった職工 だが機械は疲れず高速度回転! あっ? 機械が腕を喰った 血……血……血………
“作業機械”passage classification

Hosoi reverses the promised relation of use: the worker becomes a component of the mechanism while owners capture its benefits.

Not yet classified in the current schema

3 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English translation

I shall be quite frank: even we have not attained the absolute, exact solution of the problem of happiness. Twice a day, from sixteen to seventeen o'clock and from twenty-one to twenty-two, our united powerful organism dissolves into separate cells; these are the personal hours designated by the Tables. During these hours you would see the curtains discreetly drawn in the rooms of some; others march slowly over the pavement of the main avenue or sit at their desks as I sit now. But I firmly believe, let them call me an idealist and a dreamer, I believe that sooner or later we shall somehow find even for these hours, a place in the general formula. Somehow, all of the 86,400 seconds will be incorporated in the Tables of Hours.
Local word range 4971–5395passage classification

The passage presents a society whose Tables regulate nearly all time and collective conduct, treating the absorption of private hours into a general formula as the route to happiness. The narrator appears to endorse this logic, but the dystopian fiction makes the resulting loss of private choice and individual separation satirically alarming.

Passage 2 · English translation

Your mission is to subjugate to the grateful yoke of reason the unknown beings who live on other planets, and who are perhaps still in the primitive state of freedom. If they will not understand that we are bringing them a mathematically faultless happiness, our duty will be to force them to be happy. But before we take up arms, we shall try the power of words.
Record One, announcement of the Integral’s missionpassage classification

The United State presents coercive rational administration as mathematically perfect happiness, making freedom the condition it must overcome.

Passage 3 · English translation

I use deliberately the word "criminal," for freedom and crime are as closely related as--well, as the movement of an aero and its speed: if the speed of an aero equals zero, the aero is motionless; if human liberty is equal to zero, man does not commit any crime. That is clear. The way to rid man of criminality is to rid him of freedom.
Record Thirty-One, D-503 on freedom and crimepassage classification

Zamyatin reduces a security logic to absurd clarity: the total elimination of freedom would eliminate crime only by abolishing autonomous agency.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1928Politics or economics · English

Propaganda

Edward Bernays

Crowds, media, and public opinionHuman institutions create the dangerDiminishes

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

It is not usually realized how necessary these invisible governors are to the orderly functioning of our group life. In theory, every citizen may vote for whom he pleases. Our Constitution does not envisage political parties as part of the mechanism of government, and its framers seem not to have pictured to themselves the existence in our national politics of anything like the modern political machine. But the American voters soon found that without organization and direction their individual votes, cast, perhaps, for dozens or hundreds of candidates, would produce nothing but confusion. Invisible government, in the shape of rudimentary political parties, arose almost overnight. Ever since then we have agreed, for the sake of simplicity and practicality, that party machines should narrow down the field of choice to two candidates, or at most three or four. In theory, every citizen makes up his mind on public questions and matters of private conduct. In practice, if all men had to study for themselves the abstruse economic, political, and ethical data involved in every question, they would find it impossible to come to a conclusion about anything. We have voluntarily agreed to let an invisible government sift the data and high-spot the outstanding issues so that our field of choice shall be narrowed to practical proportions. From our leaders and the media they use to reach the public, we accept the evidence and the demarcation of issues bearing upon public questions; from some ethical teacher, be it a minister, a favorite essayist, or merely prevailing opinion, we accept a standardized code of social conduct to which we conform most of the time.
Local word range 356–780passage classification

Bernays explains that political parties, leaders, media, and prevailing opinion act as an invisible government that filters information and narrows citizens' choices. He presents this arrangement as practically useful for avoiding confusion, but it diminishes independent judgment and self-government because people delegate the formation of opinions and standards of conduct.

Passage 2 · English

We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of. This is a logical result of the way our democratic society is organized. Vast numbers of human beings must coöperate in this manner if they are to live together as a smoothly functioning society.
Chapter I, “Organizing Chaos”passage classification

Bernays describes mass opinion as routinely shaped by unseen organizers, not arrived at by independent individual judgment.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1928Fiction · English

The Eternal Moment and Other Stories

E. M. Forster

Dependence, succession, and replacementDependence weakens human capacitiesDiminishes

2 selected passages · each coded separately

Passage 1 · English

To attribute these two great developments to the Central Committee, is to take a very narrow view of civilisation. The Central Committee announced the developments, it is true, but they were no more the cause of them than were the kings of the imperialistic period the cause of war. Rather did they yield to some invincible pressure, which came no one knew whither, and which, when gratified, was succeeded by some new pressure equally invincible. To such a state of affairs it is convenient to give the name of progress. No one confessed the Machine was out of hand. Year by year it was served with increased efficiency and decreased intelligence. The better a man knew his own duties upon it, the less he understood the duties of his neighbour, and in all the world there was not one who understood the monster as a whole. Those master brains had perished. They had left full directions, it is true, and their successors had each of them mastered a portion of those directions. But Humanity, in its desire for comfort, had over-reached itself. It had exploited the riches of nature too far. Quietly and complacently, it was sinking into decadence, and progress had come to mean the progress of the Machine.
Local word range 9586–10010passage classification

The passage presents the Machine as an increasingly opaque system that people serve without understanding as a whole. Specialization and inherited instructions reduce shared human knowledge, while the pursuit of comfort and exploitation of nature produce dependence and decadence. Calling this process “progress” is treated as a warning that technological progress has displaced human development.

Passage 2 · English

By these days it was a demerit to be muscular. Each infant was examined at birth, and all who promised undue strength were destroyed. Humanitarians may protest, but it would have been no true kindness to let an athlete live; he would never have been happy in that state of life to which the Machine had called him; he would have yearned for trees to climb, rivers to bathe in, meadows and hills against which he might measure his body. Man must be adapted to his surroundings, must he not? In the dawn of the world our weakly must be exposed on Mount Taygetus, in its twilight our strong will suffer euthanasia, that the Machine may progress, that the Machine may progress, that the Machine may progress eternally.
“The Machine Stops,” Kuno’s account of resistance to the Machinepassage classification

Forster depicts a technical system that preserves itself by eliminating human capacities no longer compatible with its environment.

Not yet classified in the current schema

1930factory fiction · Japanese

Kikai (Machine)

Riichi Yokomitsu

Labour and mechanizationHuman institutions create the dangerDiminishes

1 selected passage · each coded separately

Passage 1 · Japanese

この穴へ落ち込むと金属を腐蝕させる塩化鉄で衣類や皮膚がだんだん役に立たなくなり、臭素の刺戟で咽喉を破壊し夜の睡眠がとれなくなるばかりではなく頭脳の組織が変化して来て視力さえも薄れて来る。
Opening section, narrator on hazardous chemical workpassage classification

Yokomitsu locates mechanized work’s violence in the gradual bodily and cognitive degradation imposed by factory chemicals.

Not yet classified in the current schema