Humanity’s First Exam1850–1940 ⇄ now

1874 · English

The Principles of Science, vol. I

William Stanley Jevons

2 selected passages and classifications

Passage 1

Although the Logical Abacus considerably reduced the labour of using the Indirect Method, it was not free from the possibility of error. I thought moreover that it would afford a conspicuous proof of the generality and power of the method if I could reduce it to a purely mechanical form. … It seemed strange that in the more intricate science of quantity mechanism could be applicable, whereas in the simple science of qualitative reasoning, the syllogism was only by analogy or simile called an Instrument. … [Smee's designs] do not attempt the performance of logical inference.

Jevons treats formal logical inference as a process whose generality can be demonstrated by mechanical realization, not as evidence that a machine has independent purposes or personhood.

Vol. I, ch. VI, "The Logical Machine," pp. 123–124

Passage 2

After the Finis key has been used the machine represents a mind endowed with powers of thought, but wholly devoid of knowledge. … The machine is thus the embodiment of a true logical system. The combinations are classified, selected or rejected just as they should be by a reasoning mind. … It cannot be asserted indeed that the machine entirely supersedes the agency of conscious thought; mental labour is required in interpreting the meaning of grammatical expressions and in correctly impressing that meaning on the machine; it is further required in gathering the conclusion from the remaining combinations. Nevertheless the true process of logical inference is actually accomplished in a purely mechanical manner.

Jevons's precise mixed position is that inference proper is mechanical, while humans still supply semantic interpretation, correct encoding, and extraction of the conclusion.

Vol. I, ch. VI, "The Logical Machine," pp. 127–128

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