G. W. F. Hegel · 1830

Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Part III (Philosophy of Mind)

Original title
Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften
Language
German
Form
Treatise
Text
Full text
English
No English translation · William Wallace, Hegel's Philosophy of Mind (1894), Gutenberg #39064
Source text
gutenberg.org
Wikidata
Q919699
Selected
Ben Breen, 2026-09-29; suggested by Claude research agents, 29 Sep 2026
Status
Arguments unverified; quotations chosen by machine, unchecked

  • Q20HABIT

    Does making an action habitual increase a person's freedom to act?

    Yes. with qualification. Habit is unfree because it is natural, but free because the soul is no longer occupied by feelings it has made habitual and can attend to other things.

    Habit is rightly called a second nature; nature, because it is an immediate being of the soul; a second nature, because it is an immediacy created by the soul, impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (§ 401). In habit the human being’s mode of existence is “natural,” and for that reason not free; but still free, so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by habit reduced to a mere being of _his_, and he is no longer involuntarily attracted or repelled by it, and so no longer interested, occupied, or dependent in regard to it. The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal, as habit merely attaches to the being of the soul; partly only relative, so far as it strictly speaking arises only in the case of bad habits, or so far as a habit is opposed by another purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of liberty. The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from the feelings, even in being affected by them.

    § 410 (Habit) · Downloaded Gutenberg #39064 (Wallace translation); confirmed §410 text.