John Locke · 1694
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
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- English
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- gutenberg.org
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- Ben Breen, 2026-09-29; suggested by Claude research agents, 29 Sep 2026
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- Arguments unverified; quotations chosen by machine, unchecked
Q16TRANSCENDENCE
Would replacing bodily organs with artificial substitutes preserve the identity of the person?Yes. identity is consciousness, not parts. Places personal identity in continuity of consciousness, not in the body, so a person who loses a limb, or whose consciousness follows a severed finger, remains the same self.
SELF is that conscious thinking thing,—whatever substance made up of, (whether spiritual or material, simple or compounded, it matters not)—which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends. Thus every one finds that, whilst comprehended under that consciousness, the little finger is as much a part of himself as what is most so. Upon separation of this little finger, should this consciousness go along with the little finger, and leave the rest of the body, it is evident the little finger would be the person, the same person; and self then would have nothing to do with the rest of the body.
Book II, chapter 27, 'Of Identity and Diversity' · Chapter added in 2nd edition (1694); Gutenberg #10615 is based on 2nd edition; finger passage confirmed via SEP and search results.