Blaise Pascal · 1670
Pensées
- Language
- French
- Form
- Treatise
- Text
- Full text
- English
- No English translation · W. F. Trotter translation, Project Gutenberg #18269.
- Source text
- gutenberg.org
- Selected
- Ben Breen, 2026-09-29; suggested by Claude research agents, 29 Sep 2026
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- Arguments unverified; quotations chosen by machine, unchecked
Q10JUDGMENT
Can a fixed procedure for reasoning settle a disagreement when the participants accept the same premises?No. some judgment escapes method. Distinguishes the geometrical mind, which reasons from explicit principles, from the intuitive mind (esprit de finesse), which grasps principles too many and subtle to state, and says the two cannot be reduced to each other.
They are scarcely seen; they are felt rather than seen; there is the greatest difficulty in making them felt by those who do not of themselves perceive them. These principles are so fine and so numerous that a very delicate and very clear sense is needed to perceive them, and to judge rightly and justly when they are perceived, without for the most part being able to demonstrate them in order as in mathematics; because the principles are not known to us in the same way, and because it would be an endless matter to undertake it. We must see the matter at once, at one glance, and not by a process of reasoning, at least to a certain degree. And thus it is rare that mathematicians are intuitive, and that men of intuition are mathematicians, because mathematicians wish to treat matters of intuition mathematically, and make themselves ridiculous, wishing to begin with definitions and then with axioms, which is not the way to proceed in this kind of reasoning. Not that the mind does not do so, but it does it tacitly, naturally, and without technical rules; for the expression of it is beyond all men, and only a few can feel it.
Section I (Brunschvicg), fragment 1 · Distinction opens Brunschvicg Section I (fr.wikisource; Philopsis); Gutenberg #18269 listed.