Does conscious intention help cause bodily action?

It will, I doubt not, be considered by many, that there is a palpable inconsistency between the two fundamental doctrines which are here upheld ; — that of the dependence of the Automatic activity of the Mind upon conditions which bring it within the nexus of Physical Causation ; and that of the existence of an independent Power, controlling and directing that activity, which we call Will. I can only say that both are equally true to my own consciousness ; as I believe they are to the common consciousness of Mankind. I cannot regard myself, either Intellectually or Morally, as a mere puppet, pulled by suggesting-strings ; any more than I can disregard that vast body of Physiological evidence, which proves the direct and immediate relation between Mental and Corporeal agency.

My conclusion is that to urge the automaton-theory upon us, as it is now urged, on purely _a priori_ and _quasi-_metaphysical grounds, is an _unwarrantable impertinence in the present state of psychology_. But there are much more positive reasons than this why we ought to continue to talk in psychology as if consciousness had causal efficacy. The _particulars of the distribution of consciousness_, so far as we know them, _point to its being efficacious_. Let us trace some of them. It is very generally admitted, though the point would be hard to prove, that consciousness grows the more complex and intense the higher we rise in the animal kingdom. That of a man must exceed that of an oyster. From this point of view it seems an organ, superadded to the other organs which maintain the animal in the struggle for existence; and the presumption of course is that it helps him in some way in the struggle, just as they do. But it cannot help him without being in some way efficacious and influencing the course of his bodily history.

Even the Mind acts not in that measure which is imagin'd. I know that I will, and that I Will freely; I have no Reason to doubt of it; which is stronger than that inward feeling I have of my self. Nor do I deny it, but I deny that my Will is the true Cause of the Motion of my Arm, of the Idea's of my Mind, and of other things which accompany my Volitions. For I see no Relation between so different things: Nay, I most clearly see there can be no Analogy between my Will to move my Arm, and the Agitation of some little Bodies, whose Motion and Figure I do not know, which make choice of certain Nervous Canals, amongst a Million of others unknown to me, in Order to cause in me the Motion I desire, by a World of Motions, which I desire not.

4. To this reasoning I now reply, that the feeling of pain from the heat and representation of means to avoid it must, each of them, be regarded as states of consciousness dependent on some nerve or brain movements, and that, if these particular movements were there, and only the dependent states of con- sciousness absent, the same muscular movements of pulling down the blind would follow. Every modi- fication of the succession of states of consciousness has its own modification of the succession of nerve movements causing it; and the various nerve move- ments are equally numerous, and modified as min- utely, as the various states of consciousness which are their evidence.

But I may very well say that among the physical facts which go along at the same time with mental facts there are forces at work. That is perfectly true, but the two things are on two utterly different platforms — the physical facts go along by themselves, and the mental facts go along by themselves. There is a parallelism between them, but there is no interference of one with the other. Again, if anybody says that the will influences matter, the statement is not untrue, but it is nonsense. The will is not a material thing, it is not a mode of material motion. Such an assertion belongs to the crude materialism of the savage. The only thing which influences matter is the position of surrounding matter or the motion of surrounding matter. … Thus we are to regard the body as a physical machine, which goes by itself according VOL. II D to a physical law, that is to say, is automatic.

This influence, we may observe, is a fact, which, like all other natural events, can be known only by experience, and can never be foreseen from any apparent energy or power in the cause, which connects it with the effect, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. The motion of our body follows upon the command of our will. Of this we are every moment conscious. But the means, by which this is effected; the energy, by which the will performs so extraordinary an operation; of this we are so far from being immediately conscious, that it must for ever escape our most diligent enquiry. For _first_; is there any principle in all nature more mysterious than the union of soul with body; by which a supposed spiritual substance acquires such an influence over a material one, that the most refined thought is able to actuate the grossest matter? Were we empowered, by a secret wish, to remove mountains, or control the planets in their orbit; this extensive authority would not be more extraordinary, nor more beyond our comprehension. But if by consciousness we perceived any power or energy in the will, we must know this power; we must know its connexion with the effect; we must know the secret union of soul and body, and the nature of both these substances; by which the one is able to operate, in so many instances, upon the other.