Would the capacity to suffer give an artificial being a claim to humane treatment?
Yes5
- 1764Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary, 'Animals'
Bring the same judgment to bear on this dog which has lost its master, which has sought him on every road with sorrowful cries, which enters the house agitated, uneasy, which goes down the stairs, up the stairs, from room to room, which at last finds in his study the master it loves, and which shows him its joy by its cries of delight, by its leaps, by its caresses. Barbarians seize this dog, which in friendship surpasses man so prodigiously; they nail it on a table, and they dissect it alive in order to show the mesenteric veins. You discover in it all the same organs of feeling that are in yourself. Answer me, machinist, has nature arranged all the means of feeling in this animal, so that it may not feel? has it nerves in order to be impassible? Do not suppose this impertinent contradiction in nature.
SummaryAttacks the Cartesian view of animals as machines: a dog dissected alive has all the organs of feeling, and nature did not give it nerves in order that it should not feel.
Entry "Animals" (Bêtes)
Argues that what matters for moral standing is not whether a being can reason or talk but whether it can suffer.
Chapter XVII, footnote
- 1818Shelley, Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus
Be calm! I entreat you to hear me before you give vent to your hatred on my devoted head. Have I not suffered enough, that you seek to increase my misery? Life, although it may only be an accumulation of anguish, is dear to me, and I will defend it. Remember, thou hast made me more powerful than thyself; my height is superior to thine, my joints more supple. But I will not be tempted to set myself in opposition to thee. I am thy creature, and I will be even mild and docile to my natural lord and king if thou wilt also perform thy part, the which thou owest me. Oh, Frankenstein, be not equitable to every other and trample upon me alone, to whom thy justice, and even thy clemency and affection, is most due. Remember that I am thy creature; I ought to be thy Adam, but I am rather the fallen angel, whom thou drivest from joy for no misdeed. Everywhere I see bliss, from which I alone am irrevocably excluded. I was benevolent and good; misery made me a fiend. Make me happy, and I shall again be virtuous.
SummaryThe creature demands that his maker relieve his misery, arguing that he was benevolent until suffering made him a fiend.
Chapter 10 (Gutenberg #84 numbering)
Holds animals may be conscious automata; because they probably feel and an error could have terrible consequences, they should be treated as weaker brethren.
On the other side, the humanitarian contention is quite clear--that there is no difference _in kind_ between man and the other animals, nor any warrant in science or ethics for drawing between them, as between “persons” and “things,” an absolute line of demarcation. Compelled to admit that the difference is only one of degree, Mr. Ritchie sought to evade the significance of this fact by arguing that it does not follow that, if men have rights, animals also have rights “in the same sense of the term.” I maintain that it _does_ so follow. If by the recognition of rights we mean that man, as a sentient and intelligent being, should be exempt from all avoidable suffering, it follows that other beings who are also sentient and intelligent, though in a lower degree, should have, in a lower degree, the same exemption.
SummaryArgues that if men have rights so do the lower animals, and rejects doctrines that deny animals feel pain.
Chapter I, "The Principle of Animals' Rights"
No1
- 1637Descartes, Discourse on Method
And we ought not to confound speech with the natural movements which indicate the passions, and can be imitated by machines as well as manifested by animals; nor must it be thought with certain of the ancients, that the brutes speak, although we do not understand their language. For if such were the case, since they are endowed with many organs analogous to ours, they could as easily communicate their thoughts to us as to their fellows. It is also very worthy of remark, that, though there are many animals which manifest more industry than we in certain of their actions, the same animals are yet observed to show none at all in many others: so that the circumstance that they do better than we does not prove that they are endowed with mind, for it would thence follow that they possessed greater reason than any of us, and could surpass us in all things; on the contrary, it rather proves that they are destitute of reason, and that it is nature which acts in them according to the disposition of their organs: thus it is seen, that a clock composed only of wheels and weights can number the hours and measure time more exactly than we with all our skin.
SummaryArgues animals are machines made by God whose actions follow from the disposition of their organs, and that they lack reason and a rational soul.
Part V
Both1
- 1920Čapek, R.U.R. (Rossum's Universal Robots)
DOMIN. That’ll be remedied, Miss Glory. Doctor Gall is just making some experiments. DR. GALL. Not with regard to that, Domin. At present I am making _pain_ nerves. HELENA. Pain nerves? DR. GALL. Yes, the Robots feel practically no bodily pain. You see, young Rossum provided them with too limited a _nervous_ system. We _must_ introduce _suffering_. HELENA. Why do you want to cause them pain? DR. GALL. For industrial reasons, Miss Glory. Sometimes a Robot does damage to himself because it doesn’t hurt him. He puts his hand into the machine-- (_Describes with gesture_) --breaks his finger-- (_Describes with gesture_) --smashes his head. It’s all the same to him. We must provide them with _pain_. That’s an automatic _protection_ against damage. HELENA. Will they be happier when they feel pain? DR. GALL. On the contrary; but they will be more perfect from a technical point of view.
SummaryDr Gall adds pain nerves to the Robots only so they will not damage themselves; asked if they will be happier, he says no, only more perfect technically, while Helena's Humanity League campaigns for them.
Act One