Do artificial beings have moral standing?

Questions

1. Q28Would the capacity to suffer give an artificial being a claim to humane treatment?

   Yes5

   • 1764Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary, 'Animals'

     Attacks the Cartesian view of animals as machines: a dog dissected alive has all the organs of feeling, and nature did not give it nerves in order that it should not feel.

   • 1789Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation

     Argues that what matters for moral standing is not whether a being can reason or talk but whether it can suffer.

   • 1818Shelley, Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus

     The creature demands that his maker relieve his misery, arguing that he was benevolent until suffering made him a fiend.

   • 1874Huxley, On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and Its History

     Holds animals may be conscious automata; because they probably feel and an error could have terrible consequences, they should be treated as weaker brethren.

   • 1892Salt, Animals' Rights Considered in Relation to Social Progress

     Argues that if men have rights so do the lower animals, and rejects doctrines that deny animals feel pain.

   No1

   • 1637Descartes, Discourse on Method

     Argues animals are machines made by God whose actions follow from the disposition of their organs, and that they lack reason and a rational soul.

   Both1

   • 1920Čapek, R.U.R. (Rossum's Universal Robots)

     Dr Gall adds pain nerves to the Robots only so they will not damage themselves; asked if they will be happier, he says no, only more perfect technically, while Helena's Humanity League campaigns for them.

2. Q29Would creating an intelligent being give its maker the right to own it?

   Yes3

   • c. 330 BCEAristotle, Politics

     Calls a slave an animated instrument and property, and says that if tools could work of themselves, like the statues of Daedalus, masters would not need slaves.

   • 1680Filmer, Patriarcha: or, the Natural Power of Kings

     Filmer treats patriarchal dominion as sovereign power, explicitly invoking life-and-death judgment, war and treaty making. The argument concerns paternal rule, not directly the manufacture of an intelligent being.

   • 1886l'Isle-Adam, Tomorrow's Eve

     A fictional Edison builds an artificial woman, Hadaly, and gives her to Lord Ewald as a replacement for the woman he loves.

   No2

   • 1651Hobbes, Leviathan

     Argues a parent's dominion over a child does not derive from having begotten it but from the child's consent.

   • 1818Shelley, Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus

     The creature tells Victor 'I ought to be thy Adam', and Victor recognises 'the duties of a creator towards his creature', framing the relation as obligation rather than ownership.

   Both2

   • 1689Locke, Second Treatise of Government

     Argues men are God's property because they are his workmanship, but that human parents do not own children they beget, since children are the workmanship of their maker, the Almighty.

   • 1920Čapek, R.U.R. (Rossum's Universal Robots)

     Robots are manufactured and sold by a company as products; the play ends with their revolt against their makers.

Works

• c. 330 BCEAristotle, Politics
• 1637Descartes, Discourse on Method
• 1651Hobbes, Leviathan
• 1680Filmer, Patriarcha: or, the Natural Power of Kings
• 1689Locke, Second Treatise of Government
• 1764Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary, 'Animals'
• 1789Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
• 1818Shelley, Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus
• 1874Huxley, On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and Its History
• 1886l'Isle-Adam, Tomorrow's Eve
• 1892Salt, Animals' Rights Considered in Relation to Social Progress
• 1920Čapek, R.U.R. (Rossum's Universal Robots)